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THE MASK OF VIRTUE: THEORIES OF ARETAIC LEGISLATION
IN A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE

DONALD J. KOCHAN*
ABSTRACT
This Article is a first-of-its-kind application of public choice theory to
recently developing theories of virtue jurisprudence. Particularly, this Article
focuses on not-yet-developed theories of aretaic (or virtue-centered)
legislation. This Article speculates what the contours of such theories might be
and analyzes the production of such legislation through a public choice lens.
Any virtue jurisprudence theory as applied to legislation would likely demand
that the proper ends of legislation be deemed as “the promotion of human
flourishing” and the same would constitute the test by which we would
determine the legitimacy of any legislation.
As noble as virtuous behavior, virtuous laws, virtuous judging, or virtuous
legislation may be, there is no reason to believe that any such theories, if
employed and adopted as decision rules, would be any less susceptible to the
debilitating realities of public choice and interest group behavior than other
principles or metrics intended to guide lawmaking. We cannot expect interest
groups to be virtuous in the ends sought or lawmaking to be virtuous in the
commodities offered and produced. Legislators remain subject to interest
group bargaining and will manipulate a virtue-based rule for private gains
through masking techniques rather than advance the concept of virtue itself.
While some legislation will be drafted to seem virtuous to the public on its
outside, its interior will be filled with rent-seeking bounties.

* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. J.D. Cornell Law School, 1998; B.A.
Western Michigan University, 1995. The author thanks Larry Rosenthal and Jennifer Spinella for
valuable comments on earlier drafts of this work.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past several years, there has been growing attention in both moral
and legal theory to the concept of virtue as a guiding principle for decision
making. Initially, legal scholars began to consider the role of “virtue ethics” in
law and most recently a number of scholars have embarked on an exploration
of theories of “virtue jurisprudence.”1 Virtue ethics, as applied to law and
virtue jurisprudence, seeks to consider both the concept of virtue as critical to
the formation of legal rules and the behavior of lawmakers and lawmaking
institutions.2 To date, these theories have remained almost entirely
unchallenged by law and economics generally or by public choice theory
specifically. The debate has instead centered on prudence of imposing virtuebased theories on legal decisions rather than on the public choice consequences
and practical realities of implementing a virtue ethic in law.
As noble as virtuous behavior, virtuous laws, virtuous judging, or virtuous
legislation may be, there is no reason to believe that any such theories—if
employed and adopted as decision rules—would be any less susceptible to the
debilitating realities of public choice and interest group behavior than other
principles or metrics intended to guide lawmaking. Certainly, that skepticism
applies regarding legislation and the (im)possibility of it as a vehicle for the
advancement of virtue—the focus of this Article. Virtue, or aretaic, legislation
stands in an equal if not inferior position to “public interest” legislation when it
comes to the public choice critique.3 Legislators remain subject to interest
group bargaining and will manipulate a virtue-based rule to enhance the
durability of their legislation through masking techniques rather than advance
the concept of virtue itself.
In many ways, this Article is a bit of a preemptive response.4 There is not
yet a substantially developed theory of aretaic legislation advanced by any
particular author.
Nonetheless, the idea of aretaic legislation theory has been contemplated
and touched upon within the scholarship on virtue jurisprudence generally.
Professor Lawrence Solum has explained that “[a] complete virtue

1. See, e.g., VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008).
2. See Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 76 (2006) [hereinafter
Solum, Natural Justice].
3. For a discussion of the failings of the public interest model for explaining legislative
outcomes, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 276 (1988) (describing the view that
legislators “will tend to pass public-seeking laws . . . [and] has fallen under sustained and
persuasive criticism in the last three decades,” particularly as a result of the public choice
critique).
4. Chapin F. Cimino, Private Law, Public Consequences, and Virtue Jurisprudence, 71 U.
PITT. L. REV. 279, 312 (2009) (“With time and attention, theorists will eventually uncover the
specifics of the theory’s potential impact on law. A good time to start that work is now . . . .”).
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jurisprudence would include a virtue-theoretic account of the ends of
legislation, a virtue-centered theory of judging, and an aretaic account of the
nature of law.”5 However, a theory of “virtue legislation,” otherwise termed
“aretaic legislation,” has generally been unmapped in the literature. For
example, in their “Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law” in the
groundbreaking anthology, Virtue Jurisprudence,6 Professors Colin Farrelly
and Lawrence Solum explain that their exploration is largely limited to “virtuecentered judging” and that they “only skim the surface of the implications of
virtue jurisprudence for the ends of law.”7
Solum notes elsewhere that the logical extension of virtue-based theories
includes its application to legislation: “Virtue ethics makes the aretaic turn in
moral philosophy. The analogous move in political theory might be called
‘virtue politics.’ In normative legal theory, the corresponding theory can be
called ‘virtue jurisprudence.’”8 Furthermore, Farrelly and Solum contend that:
An aretaic theory of legislation would naturally begin with the premise that the
telos or proper end of law is the promotion of human flourishing. If the
purpose of law is to enable humans to acquire, maintain, and exercise the
human excellences or virtues, it seems likely that there will be important
implications for familiar debates [including (we must presume) the debates on
9
the content of legislation].

Thus, in any such virtue jurisprudence theory as applied to legislation, it would
seem that the proper ends of legislation would be deemed as “the promotion of
human flourishing” and the same would constitute the test by which we would
determine the legitimacy of any legislation.
If a virtue jurisprudence related to legislation focuses on the ends of
legislation, it seems in most ways very similar to the public interest model for
legislation. The public interest model focuses on a metric for the ends of law—
the promotion of the public interest.10 That model presumes that the public
interest is both the natural motivation in lawmaking as well as the
accomplished ends. Yet those presumptions have faced serious rebuttal from
public choice theorists and others.
Because studies in virtue jurisprudence to date have focused on the proper
ends of legal decision making, the theories have not been significantly
5. Solum, Natural Justice, supra note 2, at 76 (emphasis added).
6. Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law, in
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 7–16. For a review, see Cimino, supra note 4, at 279
(“Virtue Jurisprudence is the first extended work seeking to place the notion of virtue at the
center of legal theory.”).
7. Farrelly & Solum, supra note 6, at 2.
8. Solum, Natural Justice, supra note 2, at 76.
9. Farrelly & Solum, supra note 6, at 2.
10. Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate, 29
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 214 (2005) [hereinafter Morriss et al., Choosing].
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evaluated in terms of positive political theory and the processes within which
such ends would be employed as a justification for legislation.11 Theories of
aretaic legislation, however they might be formed, must contend with the real
world process-oriented obstacles that may impede the ends desired.
Solum notes that virtue has generally received “scant attention” in legal
theory.12 And there are still many open questions regarding how virtue and law
are meant to fit together, even in the collected works addressing these issues so
far.13 In particular, those theorists that have tackled the task of looking at law
and virtue have left open many questions about how their theories fit within the
trappings of legislative and other political processes.14 Perhaps there is no real
discussion of virtue legislation yet because virtue jurisprudence is following a
“bottom-up” evolution, and the theories or experiments have not yet evolved to
the point of comprehensive legislative analysis.15 Virtue theories of law
deserve some closer examination in light of all that we know about the
complex processes and complicated players in the production of law.
At the same time, the public choice literature has explored at times the
issue of virtue but has never comprehensively explained a law and economics
critique of legislation based on and directed by a virtue metric. Aristotelian and
other theories of virtue should not rule out the realities of public choice and the
fact that the pursuit of self-interest can overwhelm virtuous behavior.16 This

11. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 889, 917 (2009) (“It is striking how gingerly leading virtue scholarship treads around the
topic of virtue politics.”).
12. Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475,
493 (2004) (“Legal theory (as practiced by philosophers or academic lawyers) has paid scant
attention to one of the most significant developments in moral theory in the second half of the
twentieth century, the emergence of virtue ethics.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A
Virtue-Centred Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 180 (2003).
13. Cimino, supra note 4, at 281 (“[H]ow virtue influences (or should influence) law in
order to promote human flourishing—to ‘create the conditions for the development of human
excellence’—is an open question . . . . While virtue as a source of law is an ancient and pedigreed
philosophical concept, it is not well represented in contemporary legal theory.”).
14. See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 11, at 946–47 (“On the other hand, in virtue ethics and in
political-philosophy scholarship, scholars still regard it as an open and extremely important
question whether the prescriptions of virtue ethics can be transplanted seamlessly from the field
of ethics back to the field of politics.”).
15. Cimino, supra note 4, at 289 (“[N]othing further is said directly on the question of how
virtue is to ‘create the conditions for human flourishing’ through law. [Farrelly and Solum] refer
to this strategy as a ‘bottom-up’ approach. . . . [T]he contours of the relationship between law and
virtue are left murky.”) (citing Farrelly & Solum, supra note 6, at 2).
16. Edward Rubin, The Conceptual Explanation for Legislative Failure, 30 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 583, 588 (2005). Rubin explains the risks of power perverting virtue:
According to Aristotle, a virtuous government can be ruled by one person (monarchy), a
small group (aristocracy), or a majority (timocracy or politeia), as long as the ruling
element is motivated by the desire to serve the interests of the society as a whole. But
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field, then, is an area appropriate and ripe for further discussion on what public
choice can teach us about the possibilities of a virtue-centered rule for
determining the legitimacy of legislation.
Some literature on evaluating legislative behavior based on standards of
civic virtue helps establish a starting point for the analysis of an aretaic theory
of legislation. It is instructive to begin with an observation from G. Marcus
Cole and to build from there in this Article. Cole asserts that “[t]here is no
reason to assume that democratic governments are virtuous in theory, and there
is good reason to believe that they fail to reflect popular concepts of virtue in
practice.”17 Cole continues by explaining that in light of public choice
understandings of the production of legislation, there is no reason to believe
that governments will be moral or virtuous or even that it is possible to create
rules that move them in that direction:
Why cannot government provide moral guidance? What exactly is
government? Is it something better than the individual? Is it “practiced” by
those higher or more virtuous? Does it respond to popular, obviously flawed
concepts of virtue? Even if it does, are its operatives sufficiently skilled to
regulate such a delicate area of human affairs?
Public choice theory has provided many reasons, in addition to those
provided by the Founders, to mistrust pure democracy. Majoritarian processes
are now known to be limited and corruptible by “logrolling,” Condorcet
cycling, and Arrow’s Theorem, resulting in special interest legislation that
does not even represent the views of the majority. Why would legislation of
aspirational morality be immune from these legislative infirmities?
Furthermore, even if legislation actually reflected the will of the majority,
why should one expect fifty-one percent of the electorate to be particularly
18
“moral?”

This Article will explore these and other questions that arise from aretaic
theories of legislation from a public choice perspective.
Part I discusses the concept of virtue and explores why, in concept, virtue
is a good thing and noble pursuit. This first Part also explores some of the
American Founders’ views on virtue and their attempts to consider the concept
in the crafting of a new government. That survey provides a useful compilation
of thought not before gathered together—something which makes that Part

these same governmental structures can lead to perverted forms of government, to
tyranny, oligarchy, or mobocracy (Aristotle’s term for the last is democracy) if the ruling
group is trying to advance its own particular interests instead (1981, bk. IV, 1288b1301a).
Id. (citation omitted).
17. G. Marcus Cole, What is the Government’s Role in Promoting Morals? . . . Seriously?,
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 78 (2008).
18. Id. at 82 (citation omitted).
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have stand-alone utility in its own right for furthering the historical
understanding of the virtue debate. Part II is designed to speculate on what
theories of aretaic legislation might look like once they are more developed by
virtue scholars. Looking at the evolution of virtue jurisprudence and the efforts
within that literature to establishing virtue as the proper end of lawmaking, we
can get some sense of the architectural design of a regime where virtuecentered, or aretaic, legislation is the ideal.
Part III dispels some of the hope for virtue and the optimism in its pursuit
by explaining the realities of the legislative process in a public choice
perspective. It explains that the self-interested nature of legislators and those
rent-seeking19 for legislative advantages ensures that most legislation is simply
the culmination of an interest group bargain that leads to sub-optimal wealth
transfers concentrating benefits on some while dispersing the costs on the
general, unassuming public.20
Part IV explains that one of the reasons the public remains in the dark
during such seemingly distasteful legislative processes is through a process
called masking. Legislation is labeled in a way that the public demands and
sold to the public as if it is to their advantage. This phenomenon has been
described as a mask,21 a curtain,22 cloak,23 or a veil of legitimacy meant to
make legislation less transparent and shield it from critique. Legislation’s
stated purpose is often a façade24 or a charade.25 The private nature of the

19. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 46–51 (2009) (explaining rents and rent-seeking).
20. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982) (“The ‘interest group’ theory asserts that
legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that legislative protection
flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall social
welfare . . . .”).
21. Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 580 (2009) (discussing masking special interest legislation).
22. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN (Terry L.
Anderson ed., 2000); Jonathan H. Adler, Rent-seeking Behind the Green Curtain, REG., no. 4,
1996, at 26.
23. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 663, 678 (2004) (discussing incomplete statutes and the delegation doctrine as ways to “use
statutory incompleteness to cloak responsibility-shifting delegations without fear of reprisal from
the electorate. When this is the case, lawmakers can mask their true political preferences,
undermining electoral accountability.”).
24. Gregory C. Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 147, 155 (2009) (“In some cases, ‘public interest’ statutes may serve as a facade, providing
a symbol of government concern while masking government inaction.”).
25. Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 1013 (2009) (In administrative law, “the notice-andcomment process can be a charade, a purported exercise in objective analysis that seeks to mask
inevitably political choices.”).
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bargain is, therefore, less susceptible to challenge or at least the information
costs are increased to reveal the true nature of the legislation. These attempts to
pull the wool over the eyes of the electorate provide increased durability to the
legislation.
This masking process would undoubtedly be used in any virtue-centered
ethic for legislative outcomes, ultimately in the substance behind the mask
subverting the ends of virtue and using the virtue concept to hide further
private interest transfers. In light of these tactics, Part IV proceeds to conclude
that if the public demands “virtue” legislation, it will most certainly get a
virtue mask but is unlikely to get virtue in substance. Virtue-based legislation
is almost an impossibility.
Part V synthesizes some of the analysis by returning to the relationship
between virtue and the realities exposed by the public choice model. It also
offers some observations on alternatives. Because there is a high probability
that any piece of legislation is non-virtuous legislation, Part V concludes that
limitations on the output of legislation itself are our better means of
encouraging virtue. In other words, the most virtuous of laws would be those
laws that make it difficult to create laws—as laws often involve non-virtuous
wealth transfers and otherwise obstruct our ability to pursue private virtue.
While virtue may be a wonderful thing to pursue and encourage in our private
affairs, there is very little reason to believe it can be inculcated in us through
legislative processes that are inherently non-virtuous.
This Article is part of the process that fits within the evolutionary
discussion of virtue and the law.26 There is still a long discursive journey ahead
where debates and evaluation of the mechanics, possibilities, and prudence of
applying virtue in courts, legislatures, and other legal forums will be necessary
in order to determine whether and how aretaic theories are to take hold in the
law.27 This Article is one step in the necessary discussion of how legislative
processes matter in determining the efficacy and possibility of aretaic values
serving as the metric for determining the proper ends for legislation.

26. Cimino, supra note 4, at 312 (discussing the “newness of idea” and “because virtue
theory as applied to law is such a novel idea that it will necessarily take time and experience in
order to better learn how virtue is relevant to law”).
27. Id. (“Virtue Jurisprudence as both a theory and an anthology are significant contributions
with as yet unknowable potential to influence normative legal theory. . . . [I]t will in all likelihood
take years of writing and debate to fully realize the theory’s potential.”). Furthermore, Cimino
counsels that exchange, even without knowing the specifics of the theories one might begin to
critique, is not premature under these circumstances. See id. (suggesting we “continue to apply
virtue to law, concept by concept, and not until the conversation is more robust can any one
theorist step back and try to offer the unifying principles”).
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I. SURVEYING THE VALUES OF VIRTUE: VIRTUE AND ASPIRATIONS TOWARD
EXCELLENCE ARE NOBLE AIMS AS METRICS FOR INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
The terms virtue28 and virtuous,29 while lacking precise definitions and in
some ways necessarily subjective in nature, have meanings that can generally
be understood and examined in terms of excellence. And in some ways virtue
involves a concept of selflessness that seems contrary to human nature.30
Aristotle’s definition of virtue, as principally advanced in Nicomachean
Ethics,31 dominates much of the current discussion in virtue ethics and related
developments like virtue jurisprudence.32 The pursuit is arête, the Greek term
for excellence that is coterminous with virtue,33 and the end sought is
eudaimonia, which means happiness and it is a condition that can only be
achieved through virtue.34
Much of what follows in this Part involves further explications of the
meaning of Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian concepts of virtue, although not
exclusively so. This Part is intended to introduce the general meaning virtue
has in political and social discussions in order to get a sense of the virtue

28. 19 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 675 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “virtue” as
including, among other definitions, “A particular moral excellence; a special manifestation of the
influence of moral principals in life or conduct.”).
29. Id. at 678–79 (defining “virtuous” as including, among other definitions, “Possessing or
showing virtue in life and conduct; acting with moral rectitude or in conformity with moral laws;
free from vice, immorality, or wickedness; good, just, righteous,” and “Of great excellence or
worth.”).
30. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 186–87 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651)
(discussing man’s self-interested nature).
31. See THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 34–57 (F.H. Peters trans., 1886),
available at http://archive.org/details/nicomacheaneth00arisuoft. See also JONATHAN LEAR,
ARISTOTLE: THE DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND 154–55 (1988) (“The aim of the Nicomachean Ethics
is to give one a reflective understanding of how one can achieve happiness by living an ethical
life within society.”).
32. Cimino, supra note 4, at 279–80 (identifying neo-Aristotelian themes in most of the
literature on virtue jurisprudence); Claeys, supra note 11, at 903 (discussing how most virtue
ethics is Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian to some degree).
33. Cimino, supra note 4, at 292 (“[I]n well-ordered societies, the nomoi, or just laws and
social norms, are those that ‘create the conditions for human flourishing.’ As we have seen,
human flourishing is the goal of law in aretaic theory.”); Claeys, supra note 11, at 903 (“Virtue
ethics theories in this strict sense have ‘aretaic’ foundations, referring to aretê, the Greek term for
‘excellence’ or ‘virtue.’”).
34. Cimino, supra note 4, at 285 (“Aristotle defines virtue as that which allows human
beings to be happy: ‘[s]ince happiness is an activity of the soul expressing complete virtue, we
must examine virtue.’”); Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WIS.
L. REV. 679, 689 (1992) (“According to Aristotle’s political writings, the good of the political
community and the good of the individual are inseparable. The telos or natural end of human life
is eudaimonia or happiness, and one achieves happiness by living a life in accordance with
virtue.”).
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concept. For purposes of this Article, we need not resolve some true or
absolute meaning of virtue, as any meaning will meet the same process critique
leveled later in the Article. But it is important to see how alluring the call to
virtue is and to identify virtue as a worthy individual pursuit—which does not
translate automatically into a conviction that it should also be pursued as a
dictated metric for the legitimate ends of legislation.
There is some debate over the origins of virtue in the human condition and
society. Some contend that virtue is conceived in nature but nourished by
knowledge and education,35 and obtained after maturing and evolving into and
energetic and ever-present metric that places it above comfort as the superior
governing ethic of individual behavioral choice.36 But the maturation of virtue
is difficult for persons and institutions.37 Competing preferences in and
infirmities of the human condition create obstacles for a virtue ethic to mature
and transfer itself into human action. Hayek explains that knowledge of and
adherence to rules of conduct can help control these obstacles so long as one
can internalize as rational the limitations on behavior necessary to dodge
tendencies in the human condition that lead to “impermissible” behaviors:
Human action, however, is in fact as much guided by rules which limit it to
permissible kinds of actions—rules which generally preclude certain kinds of
actions irrespective of the foreseeable particular results. Our capacity to act
successfully in our natural and social environment rests as much on such
knowledge of what not to do (usually without awareness of the consequences
which would follow if we did it) as on our knowledge of the particular effects
of what we do. In fact, our positive knowledge serves us effectively only
thanks to rules which confine our actions to the limited range within which we
are able to foresee relevant consequences. It prevents us from over stepping
these limits. Fear of the unknown, and avoidance of actions with unforeseeable
consequences, has as important a function to perform in making our actions
38
‘rational’ in the sense of successful as positive knowledge.

35. A NEW DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS: ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES FROM ANCIENT
1251 (H.L. Mencken ed., 1991) [hereinafter MENCKEN] (“Virtue, though
she gets her beginning from nature, yet receives her finishing touches from learning.”) (quoting
QUINTILIAN, 12 INSTITUTIO ORATORIO (c. 90)).
36. “‘Virtue’ means energetic manliness.” RUSSELL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN
ORDER 99 (1974) [hereinafter KIRK, ROOTS]; MENCKEN, supra note 35, at 1251. (“The superior
man thinks always of virtue; the common man thinks of comfort.”) (quoting CONFUCIUS,
ANALECTS IV (c. 500 B.C.)).
37. MENCKEN, supra note 35, at 1251 (“Virtue, like art, constantly deals what is hard to do
and the harder the task the better the success”) (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk.
II (c. 340 B.C.)).
38. F. A. HAYEK, THE CONFUSION OF LANGUAGE IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 22 (1968).
AND MODERN SOURCES
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Virtue requires an absence of a desire for vice, not just abstention from it39—
for the inclination toward vice leaves one susceptible to the seduction away
from virtue. Despite human tendencies toward self-interest and sometimes
viciousness, some argue that virtue itself is of sufficiently high utility that even
the rational, self-interested individual has an incentive to embrace it in
practice.40
Some conclude that an individual’s dutiful respect and regard for his
virtuous obligations—which are described by some as owed to God, to his
fellow man, or to himself—are best evaluated through a review of his actions
in, and observable by, the public.41 One can talk a good game of virtue and
even adhere to it in purely private affairs, but adherence to virtue can only be
truly examined through the public lens and the actions affecting others.42
A virtuous man, it has been said, does not seek popularity, applause, or
bounty for his actions. Cato contends that a man seeking to obtain such things
or to gain favor from those interests willing and wanting to dole it out must
inevitably “act foolishly for one side, and wickedly against the other,”
requiring manners of deception, bribery, or other tactics that the truly virtuous
man eschews.43 As Cato observes:
Popularity is the fondness and applause of many, following the person of
one, who in their opinion, deserves well of them; and it must doubtless be a
sensible to him who enjoys it, if he enjoyed upon good terms and from
reputable causes: but where it is only to be acquired by deceiving men with
words, or intoxicating them with liquors, or purchasing their hearts with bribes,
a virtuous man would rather be without it; and therefore virtuous men have
been rarely popular, except in the beginning, or near the first rise of states,
while they yet preserved their innocence.
Where parties prevail, a principle way to gain popularity is, to act foolishly
44
for one side, and wickedly against the other.

39. MENCKEN, supra note 35, at 1255 (“Virtue consists, not in abstaining from vice, but in
not desiring it.”) (quoting GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, MAXIMS WERE REVOLUTIONIST (1903)).
40. MENCKEN, supra note 35, at 1253 (“The utility of virtue is so manifest that even the
wicked practise [sic] it in self-interest.”) (quoting LUC DE VAUVENARGUES, RÉFLEXIONS (1746)).
41. 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS 210 (Ronald Hamowy ed.,
1995) [hereinafter CATO’S LETTERS]. Cato writes:
Our publick [sic] virtue is the best and surest proof that we can give of our private
piety: Piety and justice are inseparable; and prayers said ten times a day, will not atone for
a murder or a robbery committed once a month: Appearances go for nothing, when facts
contradict them. The readiest way therefore to shew [sic] that our hearts are pure, is to
shew [sic] that our hands are clean, and that we will punish those that have foul ones.
Here is a test of our virtue and innocence!
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 338. See also id. at 82–83 (discussing the virtuous lawmaker).
44. Id.
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For Cato, it is not necessarily the viciousness of the state that is dangerous but
the access to its coercive power—when the state then is used in a manner that
makes it become itself the functional equivalent of the plundering Hobbesian
man.45
Some proclaim that virtue is one of the “the great pillars of all government
and of social life.”46 It is vital to liberty.47 In this absolutist sense, shirking
virtue cannot be justified. Adherence must be unconditional, lest we begin to
poke holes that create a slippery slope and unsteady foundation that eviscerates
virtue’s status as a controlling ethic altogether. Russell Kirk explains such
claims of “justified” departures as leading to certain moral decay:
There is no more certain symptom of the decay of the principles requisite to
maintain even our imperfect standard of virtue, than when the plea of necessity
is urged in vindication of any departure from its mandate, since it is calling in
the aid of ingenuity to assist the passions, a coalition that rarely fails to lay
48
prostrate the feeble defenses of a tottering morality.

Virtue is, then, something that does not generally provide for exceptions.
All of this Part’s discussion has been designed to describe some of the
ways in which virtue is characterized and to demonstrate that it is beyond
doubt a wonderful aim. If it were possible to achieve virtue, then it should be
pursued. No doubt, each person should strive to be virtuous. In all of these
regards discussed above, virtue is simply one of the highest aims of
civilization. However, that does not necessarily mean that it can effectively be
mandated or promoted by government or that we can expect that it will exist in
governors. Nonetheless, since our Founding, we have tried.
According to Charles Murray, “Everyone involved in the creation of the
United States knew that its success depended on virtue in its citizenry—not
gentility, but virtue.”49 The American Founders believed that, with appropriate
constraints, government could be constrained but only if its citizens were
virtuous. James Madison stated, “To suppose that any form of government will
secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical

45. Id. See also FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 6 (Dean Russell trans., 1996) (1850)
(“[S]ince man is naturally inclined to avoid pain—and since labor is pain in itself—it follows that
men will resort to plunder whenever plunder is easier than work.”).
46. 2 PATRICK HENRY: LIFE CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 592 (William Wirt Henry
ed., 1891).
47. Benjamin Rush, Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic (1798), reprinted in
OUR SACRED HONOR 412 (William J. Bennett ed., 1997) (“[W]ithout virtue, there can be no
liberty, and liberty is the object and life of all republican governments.”).
48. RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELIOT 199 (7th rev. ed.
1986) [hereinafter KIRK, CONSERVATIVE MIND] (quoting James Fenimore Cooper, THE
HEIDENMAUER 98–99 (1837)).
49. CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960–2010, at
128 (2012).
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idea.”50 Some Founders like Jefferson believed that man was innately moral,
although needed guidance and exercise if he is to stay that way.51 But, these
Founders also understood the limitations of human nature and, thus, attempted
to create a regime that would constrain the darker tendencies of the human
condition from accessing power.
Madison explained in The Federalist that the advancement of virtue indeed
was a major goal of the Constitution:
The aim of every political Constitution is or ought to be first to obtain for
rulers, men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the
common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual
precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to hold their public
52
trust.

The importance of virtue in fact pervaded much of the discourse at the
Founding.53

50. THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 49 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953); 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 223 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904). William A. Stanmeyer discusses
the heavy focus that the Founders had on virtue as a precondition to freedom and the survival of
the Republic:
Franklin, Adams, Madison, Jefferson, Washington—these are the most important
heroes in the pantheon of early American leaders. Their comments, and many more than
one could adduce, make clear the founding generation’s conviction that the Constitution
would work only if the people were virtuous. The precondition of political freedom was
personal virtue. This philosophy was the fruit of a tradition going back to ancient writings
on the essence of good citizenship, political health, and social morality; a tradition that
“stressed the moral character of the independent citizen as the prerequisite to good politics
and disinterested service to the country.”
William A. Stanmeyer, Keeping the Constitutional Republic: Civic Virtue vs. Pornographic
Attack, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 568–69 (1987) (citation omitted).
51. Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
VA. L. REV. 543, 554 (1986). Sherry writes:
Jefferson wrote repeatedly that man was innately moral. . . . The best example is a letter to
his nephew written in 1787: Man was destined for society. His morality therefore was to
be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong merely relative
to this. This sense is as much a part of his nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing,
feeling . . . . It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree . . . . It may be
strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body.
Id. at 554 & n.41 (alteration in original).
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 384 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
53. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 160–
229 (1967) (discussing the Founders’ vision as a fundamental transformation of society and
governance); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at
47–48 (1969) (same); John Warren, An Oration, in THE RISING GLORY OF AMERICA, 1760–1820,
at 57–58 (Gordon S. Wood ed., 1990) (discussing the ideal of virtue in creating a new
government).
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Franklin opined that true and full true virtue is a learned art:
Most people have naturally some virtues, but none have naturally all the
virtues. To acquire those that are wanting, and secure what we acquire, as well
as those that we have naturally, is the subject of an art. It is as properly an art
as painting, navigation, or architecture. If a man would become a painter,
54
navigator, or architect . . . he must also be taught the principles of the art.

Many philosophers have contended that the adherence to virtue is inextricably
linked to happiness,55 and thus it is its own reward.56 The happiness and
contentment that derives to an individual from the virtuousness of person57
may also derive to a government and a people from the virtuousness of
country.58 As George Washington explained, characteristics of virtue such as
“the general prevalence of piety, philanthropy, honesty, industry, and
oeconomy [sic] seems, in the ordinary course of human affairs, particularly
necessary for advancing and conforming the happiness of our country.”59
According to John Adams, virtue is innate, requiring only an essential
ability to discern between good and evil.60 A government unchecked and
sometimes embraced by a dependent public can suffer temptations toward

54. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Lord Kames (May 3, 1760), reprinted in THE
AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 86 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1965).
55. MENCKEN, supra note 35, at 1252 (“I believe long habits of virtue have a sensible effect
on the countenance.”) (quoting Benjamin Franklin, The Busy-Body, Feb. 18, 1729); George
Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789), reprinted in OUR SACRED HONOR, supra
note 47, at 382 (“[T]here is no truth more thoroughly established, than that there exists . . . an
indissoluble union between virtue and happiness . . . .”).
56. MENCKEN, supra note 35, at 1251 (“Virtue is its own reward”) (quoting CICERO, DE
FINIBUS, bk. III (c. 50 B.C.)).
57. CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 41, at 3 (“Happiness is therefore from within just as much
as is virtue; and the virtuous man enjoys the most.”).
58. John Adams, The Foundation of Government, reprinted in 2 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA
410 (Encyclopedia Britannica 1968). Adams stated the following:
All sober inquirers after truth, ancient and modern, pagan and Christian, have declared
that the happiness of man, as well as his dignity, consists in virtue. . . . If there is a form of
government, then, whose principle and foundation is virtue, will not every sober man
acknowledge it better calculated to promote the general happiness than any other form?
Id.
59. Letter from George Washington to the General Assembly of Presbyterian Churches
(May, 1789), reprinted in GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 533 (W. B. Allen ed., 1988)
[hereinafter WASHINGTON, COLLECTION].
60. KIRK, CONSERVATIVE MIND, supra note 48, at 92–93. John Adams explained the need
for primacy of conscience in decision making:
There is no necessary connection between knowledge and virtue. Simple intelligence has
no association with morality. . . . A faculty or quality of distinguishing between normal
good and evil, as well as physical happiness and misery, that is, pleasure and pain, or in
other words a conscience—an old word almost out of fashion—is essential to morality.
Id. (quoting John Adams).
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viciousness and away from virtue.61 Benjamin Franklin warned in 1787 that
“only a virtuous people are capable of freedom. As nations become corrupt and
vicious, they have more need of masters.”62 Kirk cautioned that history proves
that “there cannot be a good common wealth unless most citizens are virtuous,
and the citizens find it difficult to hold by the old morality in a time of political
disorder and corruption.”63 Hamilton in Federalist No. 1 explained that the
American people at the Founding were tasked with deciding “the important
question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever
destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force.”64
The Founders aimed to foster institutions that advanced virtue.65
As George Washington explained, governments must equally act
virtuously to abstain from oppression, while faithfully exercising their duty to
govern to protect against oppression by man against man—preserving liberty
and promoting virtue:
Government being, among other purposes, instituted to protect the persons
and consciences of men from oppression, it certainly is the duty of rulers, not
only to abstain from it themselves, but, according to their stations, to prevent it
in others.
The liberty enjoyed by the people . . . is not only among the choicest of
their blessings, but also of their rights. While men perform their social duties

61. KIRK, ROOTS, supra note 36, at 102 (discussing the “poison[ing] . . . with flattering
hopes” and the “arrogance and luxury [that] advance it,” leading “avarice” and “ambition” to
“evil” results for a governmental regime in a time of crisis).
62. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Messrs. the Abbés Chalut and Arnaud (April 17,
1787), reprinted in 10 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 297 (Jared Sparks ed., 1840). See
also BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 693 (Jack P. Greene & J.R.
Pole eds., 1991) (quoting 9 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 80 (Albert H. Smyth ed.,
1905)).
63. KIRK, ROOTS, supra note 36, at 104 (“There existed material reasons for the decline of
the high old Roman Virtue, but also that falls from virtue accelerated de-political disintegration of
the common wealth.”).
64. FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 3 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). See also John
Hancock, Speech in the Council Chamber (Feb. 27, 1788), reprinted in OUR SACRED HONOR,
supra note 47, at 17 (“I hope and pray that the gratitude of [the hearts of future Americans] . . .
may be expressed . . . by exhibiting on the great theater of the world those social, public, and
private virtues which give more dignity to a people possessing their own sovereignty than the
crowns and diadems afford to sovereign princes.”).
65. Bruce Frohnen, The Bases of Professional Responsibility: Pluralism and Community in
Early America, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931, 941 (1995) (describing virtue as key to the
Founders’ vision that “the main task of government was to foster and protect the multitude of
associations in which proper character was formed”).
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faithfully, they do all that society or the state can with propriety demand or
66
expect.

While virtue can stand alone, vice is best accomplished in collusion and
collection between individuals or groups allied in an end or objective.67 An
individual’s vice-laden end can be fueled and justified in his mind by the
acceptance of others with aligned interests supporting or collecting in the
effort. And, such non-virtuous behavior can be made effective when “justified”
or made acceptable to otherwise competing interests—or when the opposition
is disarmed—through information control like lies, deception, masks,
deflection, and subterfuge, or through coercive means including outright force.
Therein lies the risky reality of injecting virtue as a controlling ethic in politics
and legislation exposed in the teachings of public choice theory.
To the extent one can design such a thing, “Good government does . . .
produce great virtue, much happiness, and many people.”68 The question
becomes how to design such a government and whether even the best of
designs can accomplish that end of virtue.
As William Stanmeyer explains, the Founders believed that the republic’s
survival was dependent on the character of the American people:
The Constitution does not exhaust the Founders’ beliefs about political order in
a free society. They had profound insights into the kind of people Americans
would have to be in order to maintain a constitutional republic. They believed,
in opposition to most modern commentators who generally omit notions of
self-restraint or “virtue” as important political elements, that only if
69
“republican virtue” were widely practiced could the republic survive.

Stanmeyer proceeds to explain the classical roots of the Founder’s beliefs in
the importance of the virtue of the citizenry to produce good government:
This “classical” understanding originated with Plato and Aristotle. . . . The
theory posits that a republic with democratic institutions is a form of selfgovernment, but the “self” must be worthy of governing. Thus, the character
of the people who govern—or more essentially, of the people who elect who
will govern—is crucial to the merit, indeed the survival, of the polity. The right
balance of freedom and authority, of liberty and order, did not just happen: it
resulted from a comparable moral balance in the lives of most citizens. A bad
people could not produce good government. Rather, good government arose
from good people; consequently, the government itself had to be solicitous for

66. Letter from George Washington to the Annual Meeting of Quakers (Sept. 1789),
reprinted in WASHINGTON, COLLECTION, supra note 59, at 533.
67. MENCKEN, supra note 35, at 1255 (“Virtue can stand without assistance, and considers
herself as very little obliged by countenance and approbation; but vice, spiritless and timorous,
seeks the shelter of crowds and support of confederacy.”) (quoting Samuel Johnson, The
Rambler, Nov. 9, 1751).
68. CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 41, at 270.
69. Stanmeyer, supra note 50, at 566.
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the character of the people—to be interested in encouraging a modicum of
virtue among the citizenry. Again and again, the Founders came back to this
theme: moral breakdown leads to political breakdown, so the people must
70
maintain a strong commitment to basic morality.

Stanmeyer focuses on the “people who elect who will govern” as critical to the
security of the Republic.71
Despite the fact that the United States is governed “by the people,”72 I
believe that it is important to focus on the virtue of the people who have been
elected to govern—not some amorphous idea of “the public” as a collective.
The governed and the governors should be treated as two distinct groups, and
the presence of virtue must be treated separately if we are to understand the
effectiveness of constitutional design at promoting virtue with each. Douglas
Laycock explains part of this problem that comes from conflating the two
concepts. He explains, “[The Founders’] differing views of human nature were
possible in part because they sometimes thought of government as The People,
the ones to be protected, at last running their own government, and they
sometimes thought of government as The Government, an alien force much
like the Crown.”73 He continues that:
Publius had a seemingly schizophrenic view of human nature. Sometimes he
seemed to think of people as virtuous protectors of their own liberty, and
sometimes he seemed to think of people as self-interested abusers of power.
One reason it was possible to have schizophrenic thoughts about human nature
is that the Founders had subdivided a single group of people into two different
roles and were thus thinking of them in two entirely different ways. The
74
general populace was at the same time the government and the governed.

While we can examine institutional design in an attempt to steer politicians
towards virtue and control legislator tendencies toward vice, Samuel Adams
posited that “neither the wisest constitution nor the wisest laws will secure the
liberty and happiness of a people whose manners are universally corrupt.”75 As
Alexis de Tocqueville has been attributed to have said, “America is great
because she is good and if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease

70. Id. at 566–67.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 567–68 (discussing the Founders’ ideas of the people governing). The maxim
“government by the people” has a long history in American political discussions, including
famously by Abraham Lincoln. See Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863),
reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, 536 (Don E.
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (discussing the “great task . . . that government of the people, by the
people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth”).
73. Douglas Laycock, Individual Liberty and Constitutional Architecture: The Founders’
Prompt Correction of Their Own Mistake, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 84 (1993).
74. Id.
75. WILLIAM V. WELLS, 1 THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SAMUEL ADAMS 22 (1865).
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to be great,” and much of that test of goodness will depend on the level of
individual adherence to virtue both within the people and by the governors.76
The private morality and private virtue of the citizenry was seen by many
Founders as critical to the foundation of the American Republic.77 The people
themselves must be virtuous and knowledgeable.78 This belief, of course, is
based on the presumption that a virtuous people will not only act virtuously
and therefore maintain self-order, but also that they will demand virtuous
governance and use democratic means to hold lawmakers to their duty and
obligation to be virtuous themselves. Adams, for example, exclaimed that
freedom is dependent on a State that supremely honors virtue in its citizens and
in itself.79
Franklin believed men should strive toward virtue, and virtuous men who
hold a monopoly on wisdom should collect together, preach truth, and crusade
to spread, strengthen, and nurture virtue throughout the masses.80 Such a
command would seem to justify the creation of seemingly paternalistic
regulations and rules that could demand that the governed conduct themselves
virtuously. Franklin called for an active program for the education of virtue:
76. EZRA TAFT BENSON, GOD, FAMILY, COUNTRY: OUR THREE GREAT LOYALTIES 360
(1975). See also FRANCIS J. GRUND, ARISTOCRACY IN AMERICA 212 (Harper & Brothers 1959)
(1839); FRANCIS J. GRUND, THE AMERICANS IN THEIR MORAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL
RELATIONS 171 (1968). Francis Grund explained:
I consider the domestic virtue of the Americans as the principal source of all their
other qualities. . . .
No government could be established on the same principle as that of the United
States, with a different code of morals. The American Constitution is remarkable for its
simplicity; but it can only suffice a people habitually correct in their actions, and would be
utterly inadequate to the wants of a different nation. Change the domestic habits of the
Americans, their religious devotion, and their high respect for morality, and it will not be
necessary to change a single letter in the Constitution in order to vary the whole form of
their government.
Id.
77. John Adams, Letter to Benjamin Rush (Feb. 2 1807), reprinted in OUR SACRED HONOR,
supra note 47, at 408–09 (“[W]ithout national morality, a republican government cannot be
maintained.”); George Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789), reprinted in OUR
SACRED HONOR, supra note 47, at 380–82 (“[T]he foundations of our National policy will be laid
in the pure and immutable principles of private morality . . . .”).
78. Samuel Adams, Letter to James Warren (Feb. 12, 1779), reprinted in OUR SACRED
HONOR, supra note 47, at 217 (“If Virtue & Knowledge are diffused among the People, they will
never be enslaved. This will be their great Security.”).
79. Samuel Adams, Letter to James Warren (Nov. 4, 1775), reprinted in OUR SACRED
HONOR, supra note 47, at 260–61 (“It is not possible that any State shd [sic] long remain free,
where Virtue is not supremely honord [sic].”).
80. Benjamin Franklin, Doctrine To Be Preached (1731), reprinted in OUR SACRED HONOR,
supra note 47, at 370–71 (“Virtuous Men ought to league together to strengthen the Interest of
Virtue, in the World: and so strengthen themselves in Virtue. . . . [N]one but the Virtuous are
wise. . . . Man’s Perfection is in Virtue.”).
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[N]othing is of more importance for the public weal, than to form and train up
youth in wisdom and virtue. Wise and good men are, in my opinion, the
strength of a state; much more so than riches or arms, which, under the
management of ignorance and wickedness, often draw on destruction, instead
81
of providing for the safety of the people.

This view is consistent with the belief by some that being virtuous is a
responsibility and fundamental aspect of good citizenship.82
Yet again, however, we must ask whether it is possible to reach such a
lofty goal of virtuous governance by a virtuous people when we know certain
tendencies of both persons and politics. Self-love, self-gratification, and selfinterest are antithetical and antagonistic to a moral duty of virtue.83 When
legislators exhibit propensities toward their own self-interest separate from and
at the expense of the public interest to which they serve, they are violating their
moral duties.84 Yet, that violation is precisely what obtains when a legislator
uses the powers entrusted to him to serve a particular interest at the expense of
others and in return for a personal gain—the primary contention of public
choice advocates about the reality of the legislative process.
The Framers recognized the flaws of human nature when designing
institutions for the new Republic.85 Constitutional safeguards to protect against
the temptations of man to abuse power were embedded in the governmental
structure. James Madison in the famous “if men were angels” passage of The
Federalist observed the necessity of governmental accountability when he
wrote:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were
to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls [sic] on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the

81. Benjamin Franklin, Letter to Samuel Johnson (Aug. 23, 1750), in THE AMERICAN
ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 54, at 77. See generally Benjamin Franklin, Morals and Religion, in
THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 54, at 61–66.
82. Cass R. Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 742–43
(1995) (Virtue “is an aspect of citizenship that is notoriously neglected in public discussion and
social practice. Whether rights are the culprit here may be questioned. But insofar as rights are
understood in purely self-interested terms, it is certainly conceivable that they can crowd out
issues of responsibility.”).
83. THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 692 (Jack P. Greene
& J.R. Pole eds., 1991) (As Thomas Jefferson stated, “Self-love, therefore, is no part of
morality. . . . It is the sole antagonist of virtue, leading us constantly by our propensities to selfgratification in violation of our moral duties to others.”).
84. Id.
85. Stanmeyer, supra note 50, at 565–66 (“[T]he very structure of the federal system makes
it abundantly clear that the Founders embraced the Biblical view of mankind’s ‘fallen human
nature.’”).
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government to controul [sic] the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to
controul [sic] itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary
controul [sic] on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
86
necessity of auxiliary precautions.

Washington proclaimed, “It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a
necessary spring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or
less force to every species of free government.”87 To respect virtue, a
lawmaker may not act imprudently.88 But as Lord Acton warned, “Power tends
to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”89 And as stated in a letter
to Thomas Jefferson in 1788, James Madison warned that “[w]herever there is
an interest and power to do wrong, wrong will generally be done, and not less
readily by a powerful and interested party than by a powerful and interested
prince.”90 It is these realities with which any theory of aretaic legislation must
contend.
The Hobbesian man seeks his self-interest without regard for his neighbors
or constituents—it is only a matter of power, self-help, and survival of the
fittest.91 The result is a life that is vicious—or as Hobbes would say, “solitary,
poore [sic], nasty, brutish, and short.”92 Many of the Founders of the American
Republic understood that human tendency and knew it was necessary to create
a governmental structure formulated under principles of what Epstein calls the
Lockean world as a response to the Hobbesian man.93

86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
87. George Washington, Farewell Address (1976), reprinted in WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL
ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 106–21, at 20 (2d Sess. 2000).
88. KIRK, CONSERVATIVE MMIND, supra note 48, at 9 (“[A] statesman’s chief virtue,
according to Plato and Burke, is prudence.”).
89. Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (1887), reprinted in 1 LOUISE
CREIGHTON, LIFE AND LETTERS OF MANDELL CREIGHTON 371, 372 (1904). See also GERTRUDE
HIMMELFARB, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 329, 335, 339 (1972).
90. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 1 THE
REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN JEFFERSON AND MADISON 1776–
1826, at 562, 565 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
91. HOBBES, supra note 30, at 186. See also BASTIAT, supra note 45, at 16 (“Sometimes the
law defends plunder and participates in it. Thus the beneficiaries are spared the shame, danger,
and scruple which their acts would otherwise involve.”).
92. HOBBES, supra note 30, at 185–88. “[D]uring the time men live without a common
Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre [sic]; and such a
warre [sic], as is of every man, against every man.” Id. at 185. See also id. at 266 (arguing that
“masterlesse [sic] men” enjoy “full and absolute Libertie [sic]” at the cost of living in a state of
“perpetuall [sic] war”).
93. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 9–10 (1985).
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Man is self-interested. That is not necessarily a bad thing. As Adam Smith
observes, at least in economic affairs self-interest promotes specialization,
efficiency, and overall advancement in society.94 As Adam Smith described:
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own
advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the
study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer
that employment which is most advantageous to the society.
....
. . . [H]e intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more
95
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.

Milton Friedman dismisses virtue, arguing it cannot be a legitimate motivating
force for progress and contending instead that the great developments in
modern society are motivated by the self-interested decisions of rational
economic actors.96 Because private property rights encourage exchange, and
exchange permits specialization through the division of labor, the market and
self-interested motivations work to ensure that most property (including skills)
is put to its highest and most economically beneficial use.97
But if one believes that man is instinctively self-interested, then it means
that the controlling ethic of man’s behavior—including political man—is not
virtue.98 If one believes that the legislator acts like a self-interested rational
economic actor,99 public choice posits that only when a virtuous act is perfectly

94. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. IV, at 397, 399 (Alfred A. Knopf 1991)
(1776).
95. Id.
96. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 200–01 (1962). See also
mearbhrach, Milton Friedman—Greed, YOUTUBE (July 14, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=RWsx1X8PV_A (an excerpt from Phil Donohue’s interview with Milton Friedman in
1979).
97. See F.A. HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 74–75 (1979); LUDWIG VON
MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 257–326 (3d rev. ed. 1963). See also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 56–57 (1995); FRIEDMAN, supra
note 96, at 26–27.
98. Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior: Macey’s Public
Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 184, 188 (1991) (“Public choice theory depends most
fundamentally on the assumption that government officials, parties regulated by government, and
all private citizens, when they engage in political activity, are acting out of self-interest and not
altruistically.”).
99. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 10–11 (1997) (Public choice theory posits that “[w]e must always seek to
understand political outcomes as a function of self-interested individual behaviors.”).
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aligned with a selfish act can we expect the generation of virtue on a political
stage. Even Aristotle recognized the natural tendencies of men and the risks of
abuse when they hold power.100
Normatively, some idea of virtue sounds like a great thing and we should
all be cheerleaders for a more virtuous society. However, expecting
legislatures to be virtuous themselves or shepherds for the masses towards a
virtuous ideal is misplaced. These next Parts explore that fundamental
institutional infirmity for the successful operation of any theories of aretaic
legislation.
II. VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE AND POSSIBLE THEORIES OF ARETAIC
LEGISLATION
We can begin to sketch the contours of any theories of aretaic legislation
out of a broader understanding of virtue ethics and the virtue jurisprudence
scholarship that has been written to date, even though there is not yet a welldeveloped body of scholarship on what aretaic legislation should be, nor have
theories been substantially developed for evaluating legislation based on virtue
standards. This Part provides that brief sketch, with an understanding that we
need not necessarily know the specifics of a theory of aretaic legislation to
introduce at least the public choice critique of that virtue-based legislative
concept, a critique that is advanced in the later parts of this Article. Setting
aside the complex issue of whether a mandate that legislation have aretaic
value could be enforced and what mechanisms would be necessary for
ensuring compliance, there are substantial concerns for implementation of an
aretaic legislation theory even if those mechanical concerns could be worked
out.
This Article assumes that a theory of aretaic legislation would require
adopting some ethic demanding a litmus test for the legitimacy of legislation.
The theory would also need to garner a sufficient level of acceptance that
legislators feel bound by the constraint and adjust their action to pass that test.
Presumably a theory of aretaic legislation would demand that the primary
purpose or objective of legislation is the advancement of virtue. Perhaps it
would be considered the highest or maybe even the exclusive aim of
legislation.
The idea for a theory of aretaic legislation arises out of theories of virtue
jurisprudence that germinated from virtue ethics.101 So, we begin with virtue

100. Claeys, supra note 11, at 926 (“One might object that this portrait of politics is too dour.
Yet as Aristotle explained, when not properly shaped by background laws and customs, man ‘is
the most unholy and the most savage’ of the animals. There are many parts of the world where
politics is this dour. In those areas, when political rulers assume it is appropriate to use force and
law to favor one way of life as higher than others, the results are depressing.”).
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ethics.102 There is no single definition of virtue ethics,103 and this Article will
neither comprehensively survey the literature nor attempt to identify any
commanding definition of the concept. However, as much of this Article’s
discussion springboards from Solum’s work on virtue jurisprudence, it is
useful to note that Solum explains that while “[t]here are many possible virtue
ethics, . . . one of the most important and influential varieties of virtue ethics is
associated with Aristotle,” and “[c]ontemporary virtue ethics extends and
develops the Aristotelian framework.”104 As a result, most contemporary virtue
ethics is concerned with eudaimonia (or happiness) and arête (or human
excellence).105
Nonetheless, the fact remains that there is no single virtue ethics. As Eric
Claeys explains, there are many theories, many terms, and many ways to
characterize virtue ethics:
Such theorists do not agree unanimously among themselves about which
theories even count as “virtue theories” or “virtue ethics theories.” Virtue
ethics could be understood as an “alternative” to standard deontological and
consequentialist approaches, but it could also be understood more modestly, as
“a way of augmenting one of the two main ethical theories of actions and
rules.” Separately, while most virtue ethics theories and their cousins are “neoAristotelian” to some degree, particular theories can vary widely in how
“Aristotelian” or “neo” they are. Different scholars use many of the relevant
taxonomy terms in different senses. Most important, rather than classifying
normative obligations according to two or three external standards, many
ethical philosophers instead prefer to treat different theories according to their
106
own particular internal metaethical terms.

101. Farrelly & Solum, supra note 6, at 1–2 (discussing virtue jurisprudence as rooted in
virtue ethics).
102. For some basic readings in virtue ethics, see, for example, ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON
VIRTUE ETHICS 37–38 (1999); VIRTUE ETHICS (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote eds., 1997);
VIRTUE ETHICS 2 (Daniel Statman ed., 1997); Justin Oakley, Varieties of Virtue Ethics, 9 RATIO
128, 143 (1996); Gregory Trianosky, What Is Virtue Ethics All About?, 27 AM. PHIL. Q. 335, 338
(1990).
103. Claeys, supra note 11, at 902 (“[I]t is rather hard to pin down what ‘virtue ethics’ is”).
104. Cimino, supra note 4, at 284–85 (“The [Virtue Jurisprudence] anthology adopts the neoAristotelian perspective.”); Solum, Aretaic Turn, supra note 12, at 497.
105. Solum, Aretaic Turn, supra note 12, at 497 (“For Aristotle, the highest achievable human
good is eudemonia (roughly translated as happiness), which consists in a life of activity in accord
with the human excellences (or virtues).”). Solum continues that “Aristotle divided the virtues
into two categories. The intellectual virtues were sophia (theoretical wisdom) and phronesis
(practical wisdom). The moral virtues included courage, temperance, good temper, and justice.”
Id. See also Sherman J. Clark, Law as Communitarian Virtue Ethics, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 771
(2005) (describing that “the central aim of law and politics ought to be the happiness of the
people governed thereby” as advanced within a communitarian virtue ethics framework).
106. Claeys, supra note 11, at 902–03.
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The unifying idea, however, is that virtue matters and its advancement sits high
up on the plane of ethical demands and expectations.107 For most contemporary
virtue theories, virtue in one way or another becomes “an end in and of
itself.”108
Virtue jurisprudence, as explained by Farrelly and Solum, is an outgrowth
of virtue ethics with an application into law.109 Although virtue ethics is quite
developed in ethical and philosophical theory, its potential applications for law
are only recently becoming explored.110 Farrelly and Solum and most others in
their anthology Virtue Jurisprudence primarily focus on a theory of judging
guided by virtue theories.111 Of course, Solum’s work is neo-Aristotelian,
focused on the arête and eudaimonia.112
Because of many missing details in the virtue jurisprudence literature so
far, some scholars believe virtue jurisprudence lacks direction at this stage of
its theoretical development.113 While the field of “virtue judging” scholarship
is in its infancy and is itself only beginning to take shape,114 “virtue
legislating” is even less certain as it is barely in the embryonic stage of
scholarly attention. Nonetheless, some hint of what aretaic, or virtue-centered,
legislative theories might look like exists in the early virtue jurisprudence
works.
For example, while discussing a virtue-centered theory of judging, Solum
indicates that “[a] complete virtue jurisprudence” would require also a “virtuetheoretic account of the ends of legislation.”115 Furthermore, Solum posits that
“virtue jurisprudence postulates that the proper aim of legislation is the
promotion of human flourishing through creation of the conditions for the

107. Cimino, supra note 4, at 285.
108. Id. at 285 n.13 (“By contrast to [consequentialist] approaches, neo-Aristotelian virtue
theory derives its justification from virtue as an end in and of itself: virtue promotes human
excellence, and human excellence is an end of itself, not tethered either to the concepts of duty or
welfare.”).
109. Farrelly & Solum, supra note 6, at 1–2. See also Solum, Aretaic Turn, supra note 12, at
498 (“The move from virtue ethics to virtue jurisprudence is simply the translation of the aretaic
turn in moral theory to the context of lawmaking and adjudication.”).
110. Id. at 3–7.
111. See id. at 2.
112. Cimino, supra note 12, at 280 (summarizing Virtue Jurisprudence as contending that
“neo-Aristotelian principles of virtue and excellence (arête), is a better normative basis for law
than either economics or rights”).
113. Id. at 282 (“[T]he method of reasoning inherent in virtue jurisprudence—in Aristotelian
terms, phronesis, or “practical wisdom”—is quite different than the method of analysis of either
of the two dominant theories. Specifically, unlike either consequentialism or deontology, virtue
jurisprudence does not depend on a single core substantive principle or value to guide all
reasoning . . . .”).
114. Farrelly & Solum, supra note 6, at 1–2.
115. Solum, Natural Justice, supra note 2, at 76.
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development of human excellence,”116 and to advance what a virtue
jurisprudential theorist would define as the purpose of law—“enabl[ing]
humans to acquire, maintain, and exercise the human excellences or
virtues.”117
In fact, Solum counsels that the scope of virtue jurisprudence is broad and
invites many questions, including regarding how the theories fit with
legislation:
A full account of the implications of virtue ethics and epistemology for
legal theory is a very large topic. Among the issues raised by virtue
jurisprudence are the following: Virtue ethics has implications for an account
of the proper ends of legislation. If the aim of law is to make citizens virtuous
(as opposed to maximizing utility or realising [sic] a set of moral rights), what
118
are the implications for the content of the laws?

Although the details of an aretaic theory of legislation have not been fully
developed in the literature, Solum’s remarks at least lead one to believe that
any such theory would (1) set an “aim,” goal, decision rule, litmus test, or
whatever you might call it for identifying the proper ends of legislation and for
testing the legitimacy of those laws, and (2) part of the content in such
legislation would be to “make citizens virtuous”—in other words through
either enhancement, inducement, or regulation, it would seek to control the
conduct and behavior of individuals. Solum did not elaborate further on the
architecture of an aretaic theory of legislation, nor am I aware of any others
that have done so to date in any great detail. It is unclear whether and where
virtue jurisprudence is meant to have application.119 But for purposes of this
Article, we will speculate on the likely basic features of a theory of aretaic
legislation.
Aretaic legislation could be virtue-enhancing, virtue-inducing, or virtueregulating legislation. Virtue-enhancing legislation might include subsidies to
encourage virtuous behavior or government legislation authorizing or funding
events or programs that educate citizens on how to be virtuous. Virtueinducing legislation would make being virtuous beneficial to any citizen and
therefore incentivize personal investment in virtuous behavior. Such legislation
could include qualifications for the provisions of assistance to encourage virtue
(such as work requirements for welfare), qualifications of virtue for holding

116. Solum, Aretaic Turn, supra note 12, at 498.
117. Farrelly & Solum, supra note 6, at 2.
118. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence, supra note 12, at 181.
119. Cimino, supra note 4, at 281–82 (“[T]he volume does not directly ask, and so cannot
answer, some very important questions. One is how does (or should) virtue affect law? For
example, should virtue be the source of substantive legal standards or rules, as at least one of the
essays suggests? Or, as others suggest, should the process of reasoning in virtue theory serve as a
guide to reasoning in legal theory? Or is this all just theoretical, with no practical application?”).
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office, rewards for identifiable virtuous acts, or other stimulus. Virtueregulating legislation could include penalties for non-virtuous behavior,
outright bans on activities that are considered non-virtuous, permit conditions
to control risks for vice associated with activities, and other means of dictating
what is and is not lawful behavior through a virtue metric.
One of the authors in Virtue Jurisprudence does focus on legislative ends,
giving us some insight into what aretaic theories of legislation might look like.
Robert George develops a theory to support morals-based legislation,120 which
he believes follows in the same line and tradition as virtue jurisprudence.121 He
recognizes some limitations, noting that “it is a mistake to suppose that laws by
themselves are sufficient to establish and maintain a healthy moral ecology. It
is equally a mistake to suppose, however, that laws have nothing to contribute
to that goal.”122 So, George does not wholeheartedly advocate for an
unconditional normative aim for legislation but sees a place for it in the
regulation of the extremes of behavior:
Critics of morals legislation often point out that law is a ‘blunt instrument’
[sic]. There is truth in this claim: law really is poorly suited to dealing with the
complexities and details of individual’s moral lives. Laws can forbid the
grosser forms of vice, but certainly cannot prescribe the finer points of virtue.
Nonetheless, laws that effectively uphold public morality may contribute
significantly to the common good of any community by helping to preserve the
moral ecology which will help to shape, for better or worse, the morally selfconstituting choices by which people form their character, and in turn affect
the milieu in which they and others will in [the] future have to make such
123
choices.

Of course, the George essay speaks more in terms of morals legislation than
“virtue legislation” per se, but the general idea is the same—the identification
of furtherance of a normative end as the legitimate aim of legislation. George
believes it is only sometimes desirable to set a moral standard, but that at other
120. Robert P. George, The Central Tradition—Its Value and Limits, in VIRTUE
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 24, 29–46 (recognizing that there are limits to legislating virtue
or morals generally but that there is some role for morals legislation). See also ROBERT P.
GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 25–26 (1993) (“[T]he
law must first settle people down if it is to help them to gain some appreciation of the good, some
grasp of the intrinsic value of morally upright choosing, some control by their reason of their
passions.”).
121. Cimino, supra note 4, at 291 (“[I]n the end, George supports the view that the state is
justified in taking the lead in passing ‘morals legislation’ to implement basic principles of what
he calls the ‘perfectionist tradition’ . . . .”).
122. George, supra note 120, at 46. See also Cimino, supra note 4, at 291 (evaluating the
George essay and concluding that “George does not embrace the traditions of Aristotle and
Aquinas without critique, but he does recognize the need for, and support, state intervention as to
education in virtue.”).
123. Id. at 47.
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times it is inappropriate to target legislation for the achievement of moral ends.
Others might very well take a more extreme view, believing morals (or virtue
or whatever normative goal is set) constitute “the” proper end of all legitimate
legislation.
Theories regarding morals legislation might actually be a good starting
point to develop, or upon which to model, theories of aretaic legislation,
especially given that the debate in that field already has a long history.124
Undoubtedly, I believe that most virtue theorists would contend that virtue
jurisprudence is quite distinct from morals lawmaking. Yet even conceding
they are distinct, there are some points of comparison. Each, it seems, has the
goal of directing human behavior in a particular direction through identifying
the proper ends of legislation as being the attainment of either virtue or
morality, respectively. And in terms of morals legislation at least, there is some
recognition of legitimate governmental power to regulate in that field of public
health, safety and morals,125 something perhaps transferable to legitimize the
state pursuit of virtue laws. Proponents claim that morals legislation can serve
to regulate126 or can be useful for its expressive function and capacity to signal
positive norms to individuals in society.127 Opponents of morals legislation
lodge a variety of objections based on the indeterminacy and subjectivity of
morals, the existence of moral relativism, the intrusion upon individual liberty
and personal autonomy associated with public dictating of morals, and the
benefits of governmental neutrality.128 Every one of these points of criticism
could easily be leveled against virtue as much as they are against morality as
the metric for legislation.129 In terms of the principle critique in this Article

124. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Law-Making: Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1247–58 (2004) (exploring the historical
development of morals regulations in the United States); John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional
Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY. L.J. 1, 11 n.25 (2009–2010) (listing some of the works that
encompass the “large and ever-burgeoning body of philosophical literature on morals legislation
which provides the backdrop for contemporary legal debate on the subject”).
125. For cases establishing that states and the federal government may regulate for the public
health, safety, and morals, see, for example, Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 356 (1903);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887); Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504, 529 (1847).
126. Hill, supra note 124, at 8 (“The standard understanding of morals legislation is that it
involves laws which regulate or prohibit private acts on grounds that the majority believes them
to be immoral. This captures the basic idea, but . . . morals laws sometimes extend beyond the
‘private,’ prohibiting activities which are indeed ‘public.’”).
127. Id. at 9 (describing the expressive function of moral legislation and the reinforcement of
moral outrage or repugnance).
128. Id. at 8 n.20 (listing and discussing five basic varieties of justifications for opposing
morals legislation, many of which would be equally true for virtue legislation).
129. Cimino, supra note 4, at 281 (“[T]he very idea of ‘virtue’ seems intuitively too lofty, too
vague, too ambiguous, and too indeterminate for law, and so legal theorists have left virtue
largely unexamined in legal scholarship.”).
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from a public choice perspective, there is surprisingly very little public choice
evaluation of even morals legislation, a concept that has a much longer history
than virtue legislation.130
Much in the same way “moral” is difficult to define for purposes of
codifying a public consensus into law, having a definitive and acceptable
definition of “virtue” may be the most troubling impediment to a theory of
virtue-centered legislation.131
Of course there is difficulty defining virtue with any degree of specificity.
The previous Part highlights this fact. Sometimes there are divergent
definitions. The meaning of the term virtue can be quite contested between
competing visions even within the same camps that might agree that, for
example, virtue is about happiness and excellence—such as where within those
groups there are differing views on the meaning of happiness or excellence.
Cimino accurately describes virtue as “one of those broad brush terms.”132 This
definitional difficulty also just feeds into the manipulation of the term that
could be accomplished by interest group behavior. These problems have often
existed in debates on moral and philosophical issues,133 including questions
about the meaning of morality or the state’s role in fostering it.134
If you can define virtue, and however you define virtue, its incorporation
into law and legislating faces major barriers. If virtue is contextual as some
contend,135 or is otherwise difficult to define then broad-based, universally
applicable legislation may not be the best place for virtue analysis. To the
extent that it is a guiding “ethic” for legislation, its definition can be shaped by
130. Goldberg, supra note 124, at 1247–58 (exploring the historical development of morals
regulations in the United States).
131. B. Chad Bungard, Indecent Exposure: An Economic Approach to Removing the Boob
from the Tube, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 187, 196 (2006) (“The difficulty, however, in justifying
regulation based on ‘morals’ is attempting to define what exactly that entails, not to mention the
numerous problems, including constitutional, with having the government define ‘morality.’”).
132. Cimino, supra note 4, at 284–85 (“‘Virtue’ . . . on one hand, seems very familiar, but on
the other hand, is hard to situate with precision. . . . There are multiple conceptions of virtue
based on various normative approaches within virtue theory—neo-Aristotelian is just one.”).
133. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 124, at 17 (“Our ideas of what it means for something to be an
injury often reflect a set of background assumptions which are frequently philosophically
controversial.”); Andrew F. March, Rethinking Religious Reasons in Public Justification, AM.
POL. SCI. REV. (forthcoming), at 2 (Feb. 14, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2217691
(describing the possible ways for parties with polar opposite aims to each use moral arguments as
a means for justifying their policy positions).
134. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 124, at 18 (“[E]ven our concept of injury frequently reflects a
contestable normative stance which will often be reflected in our notions about what constitutes a
legitimate state interest.”).
135. Cimino, supra note 4, at 288 (discussing virtue as contextual and thus it “may open
aretaic theory to the charge of relativism”). But for an argument virtue need not be relative, see
Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, 13 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL.
1, 13 (1988).
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the powerful. Instilling virtue in the citizenry through law may be simply
beyond human capacity.
There is a difference between aspiring toward virtue as an individual or
even hoping that others will do the same and mandating virtuous behavior or
directing individuals toward virtue through a definition of virtue as the proper
end of legislation. Furthermore, rejecting a theory of aretaic legislation that
dictates virtue as the ends of legislation also need not cut virtue out of the
debate about any particular legislative agenda. Clark, for example, believes
that at a minimum virtue should stand on equal footing with other theories of
justification for legislation.136 Perhaps there is a place for virtue in the political
conversation, but that could exist absent any recognition of a jurisprudence of
virtue and presumably it is advanced as an argument for legislation already, but
that is distinct from giving virtue some special status.137
But even as one of many metrics, there are reasons to question the
possibility of virtue having a pure impact in legislation. Importantly, there is
cause for concern whether the refined ethical theories of virtue can be adapted
functionally to the less refined venues of law and politics.138 The next Parts are
devoted to those concerns. The capacity to produce virtue-enhancing, virtueinducing, or virtue-regulating legislation is handicapped by the legislative
tendencies exposed in the public choice model.139
III. THE PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY OF REGULATION
In order to understand the processes in which the production of aretaic
legislation might occur, we must begin with an understanding of the role of
interest groups and public choice theory. Given the realities that legislation is
regularly the product of interest group bargaining for rent-seeking and private
advantage,140 it is difficult to see how any broad and noble goal like virtue can
136. Clark, supra note 105, at 783–84 (“What judges and legislatures need to do is to be
willing to listen—to recognize that these sorts of arguments may on many circumstances be as
important, as legitimate, and as ‘legal’ as the consequentialist and normative arguments they now
hear every day.”).
137. Id. at 758 (“One of the functions performed by law, and which might be performed more
effectively and beneficially, is to provide a context and an arena for an ongoing conversation
about what sort of a community we are and want to be.”).
138. Claeys, supra note 11, at 921 (“The other danger is to assume unrealistically that the
principles that work in ethics fit seamlessly into law or other forms of politics.”).
139. JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 4 (1993) (“Modern
democratic states have themselves become weapons in the war of all against all, as rival interest
groups compete with each other to capture government and use it to seize and redistribute
resources among themselves.”).
140. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 19, at 46 (“Public choice theorists claim that interest
group influence on legislative outcomes is commonplace, with the effect of producing narrow tax
exemptions, protective tariffs, industry subsidies, and competitive restrictions (also known as
barriers to entry).”).
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overcome these tendencies. In fact, legislation “in the interest of virtue” seems
indistinguishable from the theories that legislation is produced “in the public
interest” that have been seriously rebuffed in the past several decades by public
choice theory. This Part begins the discussion by explaining the basic tenets of
public choice theory and introduces the barriers that exist to producing truly
virtue enhancing legislation.
While Aristotle claimed that legislators should ensure that “citizens
become good men” he also cautioned that leaders must evaluate what
institutions produce such results.141 Public choice helps us to understand the
processes and institutions that might be constructed to guard against
destructive self-interested behavior.142
A.

Public Interest Theory

For many decades, the public interest theory dominated in political science
and the evaluation of how laws are produced.143 The public interest model
speculates that lawmakers (regulators and legislators included) regularly make
decisions based on their assessment of what is in the best interest of the overall
public and in order to maximize social welfare.144 Over time, this “idealized”
or “romanticized” view has faced substantial criticism,145 particularly given the
realities of interest group influence in political decision making as revealed in
public choice theory.146

141. James A. Gardner, Madison’s Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of Electoral
Systems, 86 IOWA L. REV. 87, 168 n.350 (2000) (“Aristotle argued, for example, that one of the
most important jobs of the legislator is ‘to ensure that his citizens become good men. He must
therefore know what institutions will produce this result.’”) (citation omitted).
142. MASHAW, supra note 99, at 28 (If public choice “has a good description of human
behavior in political contexts, then it should give us some guidance on the question of what sorts
of processes and institutions are possible for us and how to construct them.”).
143. Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 10, at 214 (“The oldest theory of regulation, the
public interest theory, holds that regulators purposefully seek to improve the nation’s overall well
being.”).
144. Id. (“Each regulator is motivated to serve a broadly defined public interest. . . . The
theory posits that regulators generally seek to serve the public interest, not special interests such
as the interest of one state or community, or the interests of a particular industry or firm.”); Todd
J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 315, 325–26 (2002) [hereinafter Zywicki, Baptists] (explaining the public interest
model).
145. James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice
Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE–II 11 (James M.
Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984) (explaining how the romance of public interest theory
must meet the realities exposed by public choice).
146. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 19, at 45 (presenting the tenets of the public interest
model and explains how the public choice model identifies the “failings of an idealized view of
regulation” seen in the public interest model).
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Defining the public interest is alone a difficult task, subject to multiple and
often subjective interpretations of what is or is not good and what does or does
not advance social welfare—along with, for that matter, what is or is not social
welfare in the first place.147 The public interest is a difficult standard to
identify so as to measure whether we are successful at promoting it.
More importantly, even if we could objectively define the public interest or
reach consensus on the means to achieve it, our governing processes often
impede the realization of the public interest through legislation or other
governmental action. The public interest model ignores the way legislation is
generated to advance particularized interests at the expense of the greater
social utility and the way that legislation often concentrates benefits on a few
while dispersing costs on the many in a manner that is ultimately inefficient,
suboptimal, and sometimes quite unjust.148 This is not to say that all lawmakers
are seeking to subvert the public interest,149 but instead that the mechanics of
the exercise of legislation and regulation work against the achievement of truly
public interested ends. The next subparts will explain in more detail the public
choice critique in this regard.
Put simply, there is no reason to believe that a virtue-centered model of
governance would fare any better than the public interest model when
subjected to similar scrutiny. It seems that any move toward virtue-centered
legislation would be a means of defining the public interest as equated with the
furtherance of virtue. That is, rather than demanding that legislators produce
laws that maximize some more general concept of social welfare, a virtuecentered legislative regime would seek to maximize virtue, which would be a
more specific articulation of what social welfare should be, with virtue deemed
the highest end of it. But such a designation hardly escapes the fundamental
problems associated with the public interest model. The concept of virtue is
almost as vague and subject to multiple meanings as public interest; the
concept does not relieve such legislation from the general critique of the public
choice model that attaining such a standard is nearly impossible; it unduly
ignores the reality of interest group influence and the manipulation of the
legislative process through rent-seeking and other behaviors to achieve private
gain rather than some generally public good; and the concept is perhaps even
more susceptible to the dangerous masking process that insulates private

147. Id.
148. Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 10, at 215 (“There are obvious flaws with the public
interest theory, not the least of which is that measures furthering special interests at the expense
of society as a whole appear too frequently to be best explained as random noise.”).
149. Id. (“Publicly interested public servants do exist and, while it would be wrong to assume
agencies are populated only by angels, it would be equally wrong to assume they are populated
only by devils. It is often the angels we need fear the most, however.”).
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interest transfers from effective public review. Each of these points will be
taken up in this Article’s remaining sections.
B.

Interest Groups, Rent-Seeking, and Public Choice

There is no single virtue theory and the level of disagreement on the
meaning of virtue itself is wide. But, for purposes of understanding the
implications of public choice theory on virtue-centered theories of legislation,
no such definition needs to be provided. Regardless of what the particular
metrics for measuring virtue might be, an attempt to position any of them as a
basis for legislation is susceptible to the same and equal public choice critique.
Like the public interest standard, no testable and easily verifiable or
sufficiently enforceable standard exists for determining what is or is not truly
virtue-enhancing, even if virtue itself could be defined or a definition could be
agreed to by some consensus.150
Public choice theory posits that interest groups and economic principles
play a key role in how legislation develops and is passed.151 It envisions
legislation or regulatory action, including the receipt of governmental
“permission” to act, as a saleable commodity.152 Supply and demand principles
operate for legislation and regulation in much the same way as with any other
economic good—interest groups wish to obtain legislation and legislators have
the capacity to provide the product sought. Public choice theory generally
provides a mechanism to predict most governmental actions broadly
understood—including legislation and administrative agency and other
executive regulatory actions. Indeed, the theory is also not limited to the
affirmative act of legislation. Interest groups may often bargain to block
legislation or to receive regulatory forbearance.153
Those who are willing to invest in the passage of legislation or other
governmental action (or inaction) will be able to obtain it absent any special

150. Charles Larmore, The Limits of Aristotelian Ethics, in VIRTUE: NOMOS XXXIV 185, 195
(John W. Chapman & William A. Galston, eds., 1992) (“If the modern experience has turned on
the recognition that the meaning of life is a natural object of disagreement, then the cultivation of
virtue . . . cannot be our common political bond, though it keeps its importance in other areas of
social life.”).
151. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 878 (1987).
152. See James M. Buchanan, Rent-seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE
RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); Farber & Frickey, supra note
151; Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335,
336 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 3 (1971); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 339
(1988).
153. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 101–03 (1987).
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barriers, and the legislative bargain struck will occur independent of any
concerns for overall social welfare, the general public interest, or for that
matter whether it otherwise meets some public goal like the advancement of
virtue.154 Thus, public choice theory directly contradicts the tenets of the longstanding “public interest” theory analysis of the production of legislation or
regulation.155
Interest groups—including both those in favor of and opposed to
regulation—seek to use the government to obtain more favorable prices for
their desired gains than would be available under competitive market
conditions.156 Public choice theory posits that many individuals are motivated
to escape market prices for the accomplishment of their desires through a
process of “rent-seeking”157—expending resources to obtain favors from
government, which include direct subsidies or benefits or regulations to harm a
competitor.158 If they can obtain something from the legislative process by
spending less than they would need to spend in another forum to obtain the
same advantage, a rational interest group will invest on obtaining their
preferred result through legislation and bank the savings.159
Rent-seeking is successful because of what is often termed the phenomena
of “concentrated benefits, with dispersed costs.”160 Legislators can provide
government assistance to the interest group—creating a concentrated, private

154. Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 10, at 220 (public choice theory views “the
legislative process as an auction where the content of specific bills is auctioned to the highest
bidder. Those who might bid the most are generally those who have the most to gain, or lose, net
of their cost of organizing and communicating their bids.”). Alternatively stated, “Interest group
theory treats statutes as commodities that are purchased by particular interest groups or coalitions
of interest groups that outbid and outmaneuver competing interest groups.” Jonathan R. Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227 (1986) [hereinafter Macey, Public-Regarding].
155. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 20, 281
(1971); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 21–22 (1991).
156. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 155, at 34–35; Robert D. Tollison, The Economic
Theory of Rent Seeking, 152 PUB. CHOICE 73, 80 (2012) [hereinafter Tollison, Economic Theory].
157. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 155, at 34–35; Tollison, Economic Theory, supra note
156, at 73–75 (describing rent-seeking); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,
Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J., 224, 229–30 (1967).
158. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 19, at 50 (defining rent-seeking as “meaning
affirmative lobbying efforts to secure beneficial legal protections against competition”).
159. Tollison, Economic Theory, supra note 156, at 80 (“[G]roups who can organize for less
than a dollar in order to obtain a dollar of benefits from legislation will be the effective
demanders of transfers.”).
160. Robert W. Hahn, Ethanol: Law, Economics, and Politics, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
434, 461 (2008) (Public choice “theory examines the motivations of individuals, interest groups
and politicians to help explain policy outcomes. . . . [T]hese groups are able to exert influence
because the benefits of such policies are concentrated but the costs are diffuse.”).
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gain or benefit.161 The interest group is willing to pay for this benefit so long as
what they must pay is less than what they would need to pay to obtain the same
benefit in an alternative forum such as the private marketplace.162 A rent arises
when an activity (like investing in obtaining legislation) earns the investor
more than could be earned by expending the same resources elsewhere (like in
the open marketplace).163 The opportunity cost of using resources to obtain
legislation is the unavailability of those funds to invest in the market.164 But if
the return is higher with that choice, it is rational to invest in the legislation
rather than spend resources to try to obtain the same thing (at a higher price)
through private bargaining.165
This incentive structure that results explains the success of rent-seeking
behavior.166 Interest groups have an incentive to obtain the legislation by
granting special favors to legislators so long as the cost of the investment does
not exceed the benefit they will obtain.167 When groups “enjoy lower
information and transaction costs than others, they will succeed in obtaining
wealth transfers to themselves at the expense of other groups. These
differential costs are the sine qua non of rent-seeking.”168 It is very simply a
matter of purchasing results from the lowest priced provider, and the
politicians often understand that they control a valuable, demanded commodity
known as legislation or regulation.169
Interest groups—whether they are single individuals or organizations—
have an incentive to use available means to influence governmental
outcomes.170 Politicians cooperate for a variety of reasons. Sometimes, their
ideological preferences are in line with the interest group desires and

161. Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 10, at 224 (discussing concentrated benefits and
dispersed costs).
162. Adler, supra note 22, at 27 (“Many firms find it easier to lobby for wealth transfers than
to compete for wealth in an open marketplace.”).
163. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 19, at 46 (defining economic rents).
164. Id. at 46–49 (explaining the terminology of economic rents as it applies to obtaining
governmental products like legislation or regulation).
165. Id.
166. For a general discussion of the incentive structure resulting from concentrated benefits
and dispersed costs, see Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 229.
167. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 19, at 46 (“[A]n economic rent arises when an
economic activity, for example labor, earns a return that exceeds the opportunity cost of the
income-producing asset.”).
168. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 229.
169. Tollison, Economic Theory, supra note 156, at 80 (“The individuals who monitor the
supply-demand process are politicians, bureaucrats, and other political actors. These individuals
may be conceived of as brokers of legislation, and they essentially act like brokers in a private
context—they pair demanders with suppliers of legislation.”).
170. Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191
(2012) (generally describing the mechanics and operations of lobbying and how it works).
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exercising votes in line with their ideology will coincidentally bring financial
and other support from their constituents.171 In such situations, a legislator may
actually be acting according to principle but the alignment ensures that the
interest group is benefitted, and interest groups will exploit such alignments or
control information seeking to “re-align” the legislator’s ideological
conclusions.172 A good interest group lobbyist might also pressure constituents
to encourage their elected representative to adjust a position.173 The legislator
may in fact be rationally ignorant of the true private interest nature of the
legislation.174 Some legislators may even believe that legislation is in the
public interest, believing the mask that is placed on it.175 In other situations, a
legislator may cooperate in an interest group bargain when vote trading is at
stake and they end up supporting interest group legislation because they
anticipate future performance from the requesting legislator on legislation the
go-along legislator cares about (for whatever reason she cares).176 Thus, even if
an individual legislator will not receive a direct benefit from an interest group
related to each particular legislative outcome, vote-trading may motivate a

171. Donald J. Boudreaux & A. C. Pritchard, The Price of Prohibition, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2
(1994) (“[I]deology matters to self-interested politicians when ideology matters to their
constituents” and “[i]nsofar as their constituents are willing to pay—in money and votes—for
ideological legislation, politicians are willing to supply it.”).
172. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 230–31 (“This control of information,
particularly regarding complex issues, enables interest groups ‘to distort congressmen’s thinking
on an issue—normally all an interest group needs to achieve its ends.’”) (quoting Gregg
Easterbrook, What’s Wrong with Congress?, 254 THE ATLANTIC, No. 6, Dec. 1984, at 57, 70);
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 485, 523 (2008) (“[I]nterest groups may try either to convince a legislator that the
group’s position matches the legislator’s personal policy preferences or to shift those preferences
to better align with the group’s preferences.”).
173. Mayer, supra note 172, at 523 (“Interest groups also try to convince the legislator’s
constituents that the group’s position should be preferred by them and, if they are successful, the
groups then try to communicate that preference to the legislator.”).
174. Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 855 (1999) [hereinafter
Zywicki, Externalities] (“[M]ost elected politicians will even be rationally ignorant of most of the
bills on which they vote” for the same reasons voters are—there is not enough incentive to
investigate every piece of legislation because the cost of uncovering the private interest deal
outweigh the benefits of avoiding it.).
175. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 251 (explaining that “statutes may also be
passed with public-regarding facades because special interest groups often control the flow of
information to lawmakers. Congress, relying on this information, may pass statutes that it
believes are unambiguously in the public interest, but which in fact are riddled with incidental
benefits to interest groups”).
176. See William H. Riker & Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 1235, 1236 (1973) (describing the incentives for legislators to engage in vote-trading).
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rational legislator looking for support for his own beneficial deals down the
road.177
Other modes of influence could be exercised by an interest group to curry
favor from a legislator as well. These cooperation inducing measures could
include “political support, promises of future favors, outright bribes, and
whatever else politicians value,”178 including honoraria for speaking
engagements or promises of employment (in lobbying or elsewhere) after
retirement179 traded for governmental action or inaction beneficial to the
interest group. The desire to be reelected, seeking higher office, or seeking a
lucrative or prestigious post-legislative job could induce a legislator to support
an interest group preference.180 Using any of these techniques, from appeal to
ideology all the way to the appeal to campaign budgets, pocketbooks, and ego,
interest groups know how to hit the “pressure points” where legislators can be
swayed to vote for a private interest bargain.181 The legislator might do so

177. Id.
178. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 228. Zywicki further explains the
politician’s incentives:
Once in office, politicians garner direct benefits from speaking and appearance
honoraria and expenses-paid junkets to posh locales. . . . [P]rivate interests also supply
generous in-kind benefits, such as celebrity appearances, private planes, and meeting
facilities. Much of the day-to-day currency of political influence includes meals at
gourmet restaurants, rounds of golf, gifts, and entertainment. Indeed, many of these
benefits now trickle down to Congressional staffers . . . .
Zywicki, Externalities, supra note 174, at 890.
179. Easterbrook, supra note 172, at 70–72. Mayer describes a wide range of favors interest
groups might offer to legislators:
Interest groups also provide needed campaign financing and reelection support such as
individual and bundled campaign contributions, campaign volunteers, campaign-related
advertising, and voter mobilization efforts—not to mention wielding the threat of electoral
opposition. Finally, interest groups also have historically sought to appeal to less highminded personal preferences by providing lavish gifts, lucrative honoraria, desirable
social connections, comfortable post-government service positions, and even pleasant
companionship.
Mayer, supra note 172, at 524.
180. Zywicki, Externalities, supra note 174, at 888 (discussing “fame, power, and money”
and the need for money in reelections and campaigns for higher offices).
181. Mayer provides a useful list of these “pressure points”:
Legislators and, by extension, their staffs, have their actions shaped by a number of
different but interrelated preferences: their personally desired policy results, which
usually includes results that further their ideological goals and/or their view of the public
interest; the policy results preferred by those they represent; a desire for power and
authority within the legislature; a desire to be re-elected; and more self-interested desires,
such as to become wealthy, to become publicly recognized, and so on. Interest groups can
and do try to affect legislators by using all of these pressure points to achieve their desired
goals.
Mayer, supra note 172, at 522.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

330

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:295

sometimes knowing of the private interest nature of the legislation, sometimes
knowing of the private interest nature but believing it serves a greater public
interest, sometimes willfully blind to the private interest gain, and sometimes
just ignorant of the fact that the primary beneficiary of the legislation is a
private interest group with the typically accompanying detriment to the overall
public interest. The legislator is quite simply not immune from the same
tendencies toward the satisfaction and advancement of self-interest that
generally dominate human motivations.182
Information costs also play a pivotal role in interest group success.183 The
information costs incurred to discover the impact of any single legislative issue
on the taxpayer are high, thereby deterring him from identifying his interests in
the first place.184 Fighting against the government is thereafter expensive, and
it is seldom cost-efficient to wage a fight against any particular piece of special
interest legislation even when one can see the harm being done. That is the
brilliance that makes rent-seeking successful for interest groups. The
dispersion of costs, itself, is meant to limit the incentives for any one person to
challenge a particular piece of interest group legislation.185 The dispersion also
creates substantial information costs to the public in obtaining and exposing
the private nature of any legislative deal. 186
As Macey explains, “One of the primary reasons for the public’s failure to
rise up in indignation at the special interest nature of certain pieces of
legislation is simply the cost of discovering what Congress is doing.”187 It will
be rational to remain ignorant of the effects of legislation, even when such
legislation could do one harm.188 It is just too expensive to learn of the

182. See also BASTIAT, supra note 45, at 62–63 (explaining that if man is naturally inclined to
self-interest and immoral acts, there is no reason to believe legislators would be different).
183. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 229. As Macey explains:
The high information and transaction costs associated with representative
government enable interest groups to obtain wealth transfers from society as a whole to
themselves. Information costs are incurred by an individual or group in the process of
discovering the impact of an issue on the wealth of that individual or group, as well as the
costs of identifying similarly situated individuals or groups who are likely to share the
costs of obtaining political action.
Id.
184. Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 10, at 225 (describing the role of rational ignorance
in rent-seeking).
185. Id. at 224.
186. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL
MARKETS 69–70 (1981). Hayes explains that “[m]embers of the mass public will generally find it
irrational to obtain the information necessary to identify their interests on any given issue and
moreover will be ill-equipped to interpret any information they do obtain.” Id.
187. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 256.
188. Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 10, at 225–26 (“Rational ignorance means that
individuals consider the benefits and costs of being informed. . . . When there are no perceived
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offending legislation, and even after learning of it then expending resources to
prevent the harm would be irrational as well.
Consider, for example, an individual that lives near an industrial park that
includes a number of different polluting facilities. This individual suffers one
dollar of harm from the pollutants present in the air that might be caused by
and traceable to one of the nearby facilities. First off, this harm is so negligible
that the person may not even know he is suffering harm. In such a case, he
does not even know he needs to see a doctor and does not even know that he
should be upset at the polluters. Meanwhile, assume that while feeling
completely normal he wants to see a doctor for ten dollars to ask whether he is
suffering any harm or hire an expert for ten dollars to test the air in order to
discover the one dollar of harm. It would be irrational to take either diagnostic
step, the cost of which already exceeds the harm let alone what would be
required for the cure.
Assume next, alternatively, that the harmed individual knows he is
suffering one dollar harm. This individual is not likely to spend what is
required—let us say again ten dollars—to investigate the source of the harm,
bring a lawsuit, and ultimately hope to recover the one dollar in damages.
Thus, the rational individual either (a) never discovers that he is being harmed,
or (b) discovers that he is being harmed but again considers it irrational to try
to fight against the harm. The same is true of the general member of the public
suffering negligible harm from any one piece of legislation as the costs are
dispersed across the population.
Dispersion helps avoid transparency and helps those involved in interest
group bargains to escape scrutiny. Thus, the true impact of private interest
legislation is hidden by a plethora of little nicks in each member of the public’s
pocket—each one immunized from challenge by the difficulty of challenges to
each small, isolated wealth transfer. Each single cut, therefore, evades medical
intervention, even though the resulting body suffers a death by a thousand cuts.
Any individual willing to pay the information and transaction costs
associated with fighting legislation would also be required to share the benefit

benefits to having additional information but there are costs, the individual rationally chooses to
be ignorant on that topic.”). Zywicki also explains the concept:
This skepticism about the ability of democratic politics to control rent-seeking behavior is
grounded in several factors. First, voters are rationally ignorant of politics. Because each
individual’s vote will have a trivial impact on an election, voters have little incentive to
invest time, money, and effort to learn about the details of alternative policies. Given the
small benefits to each individual in relation to the costs, few private individuals will
educate themselves about the issues to be considered. Even if the public is able to monitor
at a very high level of generality, it will be unable to understand all of the details of
legislation and will be unable to retain the energy and interest to monitor subsequent
amendments to the legislation and its implementation and enforcement . . . .
Zywicki, Externalities, supra note 174, at 855.
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(the absence of legislation) with everyone.189 Known as the “free-rider”
problem, it is irrational for most individuals to incur the costs of fighting
alone.190 Identification of similarly situated individuals and collective action
problems make it too difficult to form a group that could share the cost of a
legislative fight to defeat the legislation.191 Thus, there will be little incentive
for affected persons to come together to fight legislation or regulation,
especially in light of the low prospects for success when facing more
organized, pre-existing coalitions.192 As a result of the public ignorance, there
are few repercussions for legislators that agree to play a part in interest group
transfers.193
Interest groups face no such information cost or spending barrier.194 With a
concentrated benefit on the line, the interest group involved has almost no
information costs to identify that they like the legislation or what the
legislation says—they, after all, propose, draft, and set the contours of the
legislation themselves.195 Moreover, the interest group hopes to win big so it is
likely to spend big to get that win. The interest group will spend up to the
amount of the large, concentrated benefit in order to obtain the rent, and this
amount will almost always exceed what a rational individual who is sharing a
diluted and dispersed cost would be willing to spend to oppose.196 Thus, with

189. MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 41–47 (1982); Macey, PublicRegarding, supra note 154, at 229–30 (“It is costly to acquire and disseminate information about
these wealth transfers, and any gains from efforts in this regard must be shared with everyone.
Consequently, rational members of the public will not try to acquire information about these
transfers.”).
190. ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE
ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 17 (1981).
191. See id. at 18.
192. As Macey explains, “Pre-existing coalitions and groups of allied individuals will be
more effective than dispersed individuals in obtaining transfers of wealth from society as a whole
to themselves.” Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 229.
193. Id. at 232 (calling these low costs and resulting ease of cooperation “[t]he most
disturbing feature of interest group theory”).
194. Id. at 229–30.
195. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 587 (2002) (discussing interest group roles in
proposing and drafting legislation).
196. As Marilyn Drees explains the consequences of the incentive differentials involved:
“Since their payoff is big and their organizing cost relatively small, the concentrated interest
group will coalesce. Their dispersed opponents, however, will not; the higher organizing costs
and increased free-rider problems mean no one will find it worthwhile to mount an organized
opposition.” Marilyn F. Drees, Do State Legislatures Have a Role in Resolving the “Just
Compensation” Dilemma? Some Lessons from Public Choice and Positive Political Theory, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 787, 805 (1997). See also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 147–48 (1965) (discussing the relative
power differential between the interest group and general public constituencies); William M.
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the imbalance of the interests and incentives, the calculus is tipped toward the
actualization of rent-seeking success.
Interest groups can also control the flow of information better than the
regular, individual citizen, especially on more complex issues, thereby
encouraging positive reaction to their agendas in legislatures and to the
electorate.197 This gives them a competitive advantage for their agenda. The
special interest is likely to have a larger influence in the political process and
thereby able to offer more to legislators.
In recognition of the importance of information costs in determining the
success or failure of interest group bargains, both legislators and interest
groups have incentives to make the general public believe that their actions are
public-minded and that the legislative agenda has nothing to do with private
gain.198 While this “masking” concept is discussed in greater detail in the next
Part, a few words are instructive here. Both the suppliers (legislators) and
consumer-demanders (interest groups) of legislation will engage in activities
that erect barriers to the public discovery of the true nature of their actions and
that increase the information costs for any of curious members of the public.199
They will do their best to mask their activities in some public interest.200 While
the actual effect of the legislation is a private interest transfer, the public face
of the legislation is something that is harder to oppose (or in fact easy to
support) and less likely to be investigated (even in the few instances where it
might otherwise be economically rational to expend resources to oppose).201
This is most successful when the public is deceived enough to believe there is
no need for an investigation—i.e., the public accepts the masking story.202 It
also works, however, when the mask itself is enough to make it too expensive
for anyone to consider investigating and expending resources to get enough
information to determine whether the outward-faced justification for the

Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18
J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (“The price that the winning group bids is determined both by the
value of legislative protection to the group’s members and the group’s ability to overcome the
free-rider problems that plague coalitions.”).
197. See NORMAN ORNSTEIN & SHIRLEY ELDER, INTERESTS GROUPS, LOBBYING AND
POLICYMAKING 75–76 (Robert L. Peabody ed., 1978); GRAHAM K. WILSON, INTEREST GROUPS
IN THE UNITED STATES 113–14 (1981); Easterbrook, supra note 172, at 70.
198. Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 10, at 225 (“Politicians . . . seek to minimize their
own costs when acting on behalf of interest groups or the general public.”).
199. Kysar, supra note 21, at 563 (2009) (“[I]n the special interest context, lawmakers have
strong incentives to obscure the true nature of the provision intentionally by masking it in public
regarding terms; accordingly, one should expect ambiguity to arise often as a result of such
subterfuge.”).
200. Id.
201. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 233.
202. Id. at 232; Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 10, at 225–26 (describing acceptance of a
legislative label and/or the choice to remain rationally ignorant).
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legislation is or is not true.203 Those high information costs make masking
work, which in turn makes rent-seeking successful.204 Part IV deals with
masking a bit more, with a specific emphasis on its role at defeating the
effectiveness of achieving virtue under any predicted virtue-centered regime
for testing legislative legitimacy.
Interest group investments and competition for the creation of legislation
or regulation (or the defeat of legislation beneficial to a competitor) involves
an inefficient allocation of resources and, rather than creating a useful product
demanded by market forces, the process simply creates legislation or
regulation.205 These rent-seeking actions make no independent economic
contribution to society and in fact severely tax the overall economic growth.206
The money expended seeking legislation is itself an inefficient and
unproductive use of resources, while also diverting resources from their more
efficient allocations in the marketplace through the private interest transfers
accomplished in rent-seeking.207 A few typically benefit, while many usually
lose.208 Zywicki calls these costs imposed on the general public “political
externalities.”209 As Macey states, the rent-seeking model illustrates that
“government will enact laws that reduce societal wealth and economic

203. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 229, 232. See also Henry A. Span, Public
Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 11, 24 (2003)
(discussing the large organizing and information costs for the general public and concluding that
“[d]istortions in organization strength lead to distortions in voice, which in turn lead to distortions
in information and argumentation”).
204. John O. McGinnis, The Bar Against Challenges to Employment Consent Decrees: A
Public Choice Perspective, 54 LA. L. REV. 1507, 1530–31 (1994) (explaining the means by which
politicians can raise the information costs for those opposing their actions by disguising the true
objectives of their actions).
205. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 155, at 33–34 (discussing the inefficiencies of rentseeking).
206. Hasen, supra note 170, at 231 (“Though it is hard to quantify how much rent-seeking
legislation costs the U.S. economy indirectly in the form of distorted government decisions . . .
the overall effect is likely great—producing inefficiencies at rates many times the few billion
dollars each year spent directly on lobbying expenditures.”).
207. Id. at 197 (“Lobbyists threaten national economic welfare in two ways. . . . One common
form of rent-seeking occurs when individuals or groups devote resources to capturing government
transfers, rather than putting them to a productive use, and lobbyists are often the key actors
securing such benefits,” and “[s]econd, lobbyists tend to lobby for legislation that is itself an
inefficient use of government resources.”).
208. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 230 (“The economic theory of legislation
does not predict that all laws will enrich the few at the expense of the many, but it does predict
that this will be the dominant outcome.”).
209. Zywicki, Externalities, supra note 174, at 854 (“Through manipulation of the political
process, benefited groups are able to impose externalities on the public without paying full
compensation for the imposition of those externalities.”).
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efficiency in order to benefit [specific] economic groups.”210 Simply put,
rent-seeking leads to a misallocation of societal resources drawing down the
efficient functioning of the marketplace.211 It creates “deadweight losses” both
as a result of the unproductive expenditures to create legislation212 and the
increased costs to “consumers” as a result of the rents created.213 Moreover,
spending to obtain or defeat legislation is diverted away from more productive
ways to use those resources.214
If the public choice critique is accurate, there is little room for the “public
interest” or similar concepts like the “interest of virtue” as controlling ends of
legislation. The process is not well designed for these goals to command the
production of legislation. While rent-seeking may not always be present in
every piece of legislation, and although when present it may sometimes be
ineffective and some publicly beneficial legislation can be created, it remains
that legislation is often produced in accordance with the demands of private
interests that seek to obtain advantage through the legislative process above
what they could obtain paying for their desired outcomes outside of the
legislature. And that legislation in the end tends to not just ignore the goals of
greater good—such as is defined in an ethic favoring the public interest or
another standard like virtue—but also to subvert it. While the foregoing Part

210. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 229–30. Macey details some of the
problems:
First, “special-interest organizations and collusions reduce efficiency and aggregate
income in the societies in which they operate and make political life more divisive.”
Second, interest group coalitions organized to effect wealth transfers “slow down a
society’s capacity to adopt new technologies and to reallocate resources in response to
changing conditions and thereby reduce the rate of economic growth.” Finally,
distributional coalitions increase “the complexity of regulation, the role of government,
and the complexity of understanding,” thereby retarding the social evolution of a society
and raising the costs of all forms of economic activity.
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model:
An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 479–80 (1988) (quoting OLSON,
supra note 189, at 74).
211. Tollison, Economic Theory, supra note 156, at 74. Tollison explains:
The social cost arises because the resources used for transfer seeking have a positive
opportunity cost somewhere else in the economy with respect to engaging in positive-sum
activities. Transfer seeking is at best a zero-sum activity in that it simply shuffles dollars
among people and groups, and is probably negative-sum if traditional deadweight costs
result as a by-product of such activities.
Id.
212. Peter H. Aranson, Theories of Economic Regulation: From Clarity to Confusion, 6 J.L.
& POL. 247, 270–72 (1990). See also Tullock, supra note 157, at 228–30.
213. Tullock, supra note 157, at 225–26.
214. Alm describes the necessity for even those in unregulated industries, to expend resources
to influence or block legislation. See James Alm, The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy,
23 ECON. INQUIRY 243, 258 (1985).
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explained some of the reasons these wealth transfers are successful, the next
Part focuses on the one tool for success most troubling when associated with
any effort toward a controlling theory of aretaic ends for legislation.
IV. MASKING AS A TOOL FOR RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR
Perhaps the most important component of public choice theory for
purposes of this Article is its revelation about the use and dangers of
“masking” in the drafting and passage of legislation. Masking is the means of
creating an outward appearance for legislation with claimed beneficiaries and
promised positive public effects that are different from the inner motivations of
the legislation with actual private beneficiaries and real negative effects on the
public.
As noted earlier, the ruse, façade, or charade as it might be called is
accomplished in a manner that has taken many names in the literature,
including a mask, curtain, cloak, or veil of legitimacy.215 Given the way that
legislation is produced as explained by the public choice model, if the public
demands “virtue” legislation, the legislators and interest groups have an
incentive to continue engaging in the rent-seeking game for personal gains but
these groups will need to channel their efforts through a new “virtue mask.”
The likelihood that the substance behind the mask will be virtue-centered,
however, is low given all that we have learned from the public choice school
about the production of legislation described in the previous Part.
This Part will explain how masking generally works to disguise the true
nature of legislation in order to deceive the public and to increase information
costs about the true private nature of any legislative deals. Hence, any
legislation that is labeled as “virtue”-based under a regime that adopts virtue as
a commanding metric for the substance of legislation may be only that—a
label. There is little reason to believe—in light of what we know about
masking—that any legislation that receives a type of “virtue-based stamp of
approval” is any different from other legislation that is actually designed to
advance a private interest. In fact, the danger lies in the use of such a label to
insulate the legislation from more exacting review. Some idea of virtue sounds
unobjectionable. In fact, that is precisely what makes it a particularly
dangerous ethic for the purposes of masking legislation.
The masking process is perhaps the most effective means for making
private interest transfers successful216 and raises serious concerns when we
start establishing controlling labels for legitimate legislation, such as “virtue.”
With successful masking, the private interest transfer gets characterized as a

215. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
216. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 251.
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benign or indeed advantageous public interest gain.217 McGinnis and Mulaney
explain masking as follows: Congress may create opportunities to create
“factual findings” supporting their preferences and those of interest groups to
shape interpretation of legislation and to also:
[P]rovide a façade to mask what is really driving the content of legislation. For
instance, if a powerful company is asking for anticompetitive regulations, the
committee may create a focus on consumer complaints in the area. In fact,
public choice predicts that members of Congress will try to create information
218
to confuse the opposition while pleasing concentrated interest groups.

The mask helps to increase the costs that opponents to legislation or the
harmed general public must bear if they are to discover the underlying deal and
effectively expose the private nature of the bargain.219 These high information
costs are part of why masking is effective—most deals never get the exposure
that would defeat them.220
Legislators and interest groups each have an incentive to hide the private
interest nature of political deals.221 Exposure of the private interest nature and
bargain in the production of any piece of legislation is harmful to the
legislator’s sale to the electorate and concomitantly harmful to the interest
group’s quest for durability because transparent private interest deals are more
susceptible to challenge.222

217. Id. at 251 n.135 (discussing the “engrafting of ‘public value’ onto a statute to ‘justify the
exercise of governmental power’”).
218. John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST.
COMMENT. 69, 95 (2008).
219. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 232 n.47 (“By masking the true purpose of
a statute and claiming that it is actually in the public interest, legislators and interest groups lower
the cost of passing statutes that transfer wealth to themselves.”); McGinnis, supra note 204, at
1530–31.
220. Zywicki, Externalities, supra note 174, at 890 (“[T]he average rationally ignorant voter
lacks the time and resources to attempt to see behind this self-serving rhetoric and determine
whether it is true, partly true, or even completely fabricated,” and “[w]here a voter has no
incentive or reasonable ability to ascertain the truth of certain statements, individual preferences
for government action are likely to be highly malleable and manipulable.”).
221. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 232. Macey explains masking as follows:
Interest groups and politicians have incentives to engage in activities that make it more
difficult for the public to discover the special interest group nature of legislation. This
often is accomplished by the subterfuge of masking special interest legislation with a
public interest facade. To the extent that this can be carried out successfully, the political
costs to legislators of enacting special interest legislation will decline.
Id.
222. See Landes & Posner, supra note 196 (explaining interest groups’ desire for durability in
legislation).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

338

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:295

The point of public choice theory is not to say that all legislation is, in
reality, incapable of being public spirited.223 A legislator indeed may
sometimes cast, for example, a virtuous vote, especially when it has little cost
to his overall self-interest224 or when it may in fact even advance his ability to
establish a record that further adds credibility to the mask that he might place
on non-virtuous legislation. An interest group’s motives might also even be
public-spirited and they may seek benefits without a design to deprive others
or without consciously intending to cause redistributive harm. Research on
confirmation bias, for example, reveals that it is very easy for individuals—
whether they be leaders of interest groups or politicians—to rationalize that
their decisions reflect sound policy or to believe that what advances their own
interests also favors the greater good.225 But, as Hutchison warns, “It is crucial
to closely examine aspects of society and government that many believe to be
innately good in order to ensure that they are not masking abuses of power.”226
That is equally true for those things done in the name of virtue enhancement as
it is in any legislation and its purported purpose.227

223. Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 66 n.303 (1990)
(“Some public choice writers concede that some legislation may be public-spirited, rather than
purchased by interest groups, but they treat the two categories as entirely separate . . . .”).
224. GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING 21
(1989). Tullock explains:
A voter in voting may be motivated not by actual outcome of the matter up for vote but by
a desire to express his own emotions, feeling of virtue, and so on. The voter may, in fact,
vote directly against his interest because he realizes that his vote has very little, if any,
effect on the actual outcome of the election; hence, he can get a feeling of moral
satisfaction out of casting a virtuous vote without significant cost to him.
Id.
225. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 324, 343–44 (2011) (“When individuals favor a certain selection, be it a stock pick, political
candidate, or public policy, they tend to search for and find characteristics that validate their
positions and undervalue those that are contrary.”). Using stock investment as an example, Lin
explains that “[c]onfirmation bias can lead to suboptimal decisions in the investment context. It
can also influence investors to invest more money in a bad asset because they selectively see only
those signs that affirm their initial selection of that asset.” Id. See also Donald J. Kochan,
Thinking Like Thinkers: Is the Art and Discipline of an “Attitude of Suspended Conclusion” Lost
on Lawyers?, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 21, 49–53 (2011) (discussing studies on confirmation
bias). Similarly, interest groups and legislators may make suboptimal decisions and encourage
investment in legislative outcomes that have detrimental effects that they simply cannot or do not
wish to see.
226. Harry G. Hutchison, Moving Forward? Diversity as a Paradox? A Critical Race View,
57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1059, 1068–69 (2008).
227. GRAY, supra note 139, at 11–12 (“all modern states operate vast redistributional welfare
systems . . . [and] exist[] in practice to satisfy the private preferences of collusive interest
groups”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 382 (1981) (arguing generally
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It is almost always possible to make some claim of the public interest as
advanced in legislation and it is difficult to see past the patina covering the real
purpose even if that gloss is only thin.228 Furthermore, “the question [of]
whether the legislative action has a public purpose is always one that the
legislature purports to have decided affirmatively,”229 regardless of whether
that is true. No rational legislator would admit openly to the general public the
rent-seeking deal that lies beneath. And legislators will make efforts to ensure
that the private transfer is transparent neither from the statutory text face nor
from an examination of the supporting background materials like legislative
reports or other pieces of legislative history.230 It is, therefore, exceedingly
difficult to expose private interest motivations in legislation.231 The more
hidden the true nature of the deal, the harder (and therefore more expensive) it
will be to find and thus the less likely it will be exposed.232
At the heart of the matters exposed by the public choice scholarship is the
fact that most legislation reflects a private interest bargain “masked” in a claim
of public interest.233 Lofty terms like social justice, environmental concerns, or
the public good abound to mask private deals.234 Examples of “public benefit”

under the lens of interest-group theory that policies, if “evaluated honestly and realistically,
would be found to lack any true basis in the public interest”).
228. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 271 (1985) (“[A]ll
statutes have an ostensible public-interest justification, and even where the fig leaf is thin it is
difficult for the courts to see through it.”).
229. Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54
TUL. L. REV. 849, 868 (1980).
230. Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 239 (“The interest group nature of a statute
will not generally be available on the statute’s face or in the legislative history.”).
231. Id. at 251 (“The reason special interest legislation is so often drafted with a publicregarding gloss is because this gloss raises the costs to the public and to rival groups of
discovering the true effect of the legislation.”).
232. Id. at 239 (“The cost of a statute that is a pure wealth transfer to some well-organized
special interest group is much higher than the cost of a wealth transfer that is masked in public
interest terms.”).
233. Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of Representation
Reinforcement, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2005) (Public choice theory “burst the bubble” of the
civic republic model by explaining that “Laws adopted ostensibly to help the public are in reality
the masked use of government to help one group at the expense of others—be it business interests
who are helped by regulation of their competitors or outdoor enthusiasts aided by laws restricting
private development in parklands.”).
234. Georgette Chapman Poindexter, Land Hungry, 21 J.L. & POL. 293, 319 (2005) (It is a
“reality that the most vocal advocates of [sprawl] legislation are purely self interested actors.
Reliance on the more politically palatable arguments of the environment and of social justice
masks the true motivation of preservation of their own land value and way of life.”).
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are questionably forwarded in eminent domain actions as another prime
example.235
Similarly, non-governmental organizations are often perceived as publicinterested even if they have the same self-interested agenda as any other
interest group:
NGOs have a political ideology. Most believe that the private sector cannot
solve environmental problems and that government must control economic
decision-making to protect the environment. This belief may be quite sincere,
but it is also rooted in self-interest. Many NGOs depend on governments for
jobs, money and power. They seek out grants and contracts from national
governments and international agencies. They also bask in the recognition they
receive from public agencies, which adds authority to their pronouncements
236
and brings their leaders prestige.

One identifiable motivation for NGOs seeking “results” is to sell the outcomes
to their members and attempt to bolster budgets and self-perpetuate.237
Human rights and international law advocates fall into the same camp of
interest groups with a public-interest face to the organization shielding their

235. See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, Public Use and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation
in an Interest Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49 (1998) (discussing interest group
influences in takings). See also Baker & Krawiec, supra note 23, at 678 (“[R]esponsibility
shifting is problematic precisely because it permits legislators to mask their true preferences
through meaningless ideological statements, while at the same time satisfying interest group
pressure or avoiding responsibility for difficult decisions. As long as Congress can engage in
responsibility-shifting delegations, voters will find it more difficult to ascertain legislators’ true
ideologies.”); Boudreaux, supra note 233, at 8–9 (“In a classic example of the public-choice
criticism of putatively public welfare initiatives being a mask for private gain, these authorities
seized private property—often lower-income and African American neighborhoods—in cities
across the country. Shielded by the banner of housing reform, these seizures were spurred largely
by the prospect of profit for private developers who sought subsidized land.”); Jim Rossi, The
Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 379, 415 (2009) (Private utilities exercise profit seeking influence in the regulatory process
and their agenda “is magnified, perhaps even masked, by environmental interest groups, who are
allied with powerful incumbent firms in favoring state and local regulation of the industry.”).
236. JAMES SHEEHAN, GLOBAL GREENS: INSIDE THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ESTABLISHMENT 2 (1998). See also JEREMY RABKIN AND JAMES SHEEHAN, GLOBAL GREENS,
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (1999); Sanford E. Gaines, Global and Regional Perspectives on
International Environmental Protection, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 983, 1000–03 (1997) (detailing the
substantial role played by NGOs in the formation and structure of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, Commission on Environmental Cooperation, and the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation).
237. Zywicki, Baptists, supra note 144, at 316–18 (“Their activities can be understood as
being identical to those of any other interest group—namely, the desire to use the coercive power
of government to subsidize their personal desires for greater environmental protection and to
redistribute wealth and power to themselves.”).
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rent-seeking activities from meaningful scrutiny.238 Countries too play the rentseeking game at the international law level, and “any analysis of the demand
for international law must account for rent-seeking by interest groups.”239
Sargent explains, “Assertions of fairness, ‘the public interest,’ social
justice, and equality thus are often perceived within the law and economics
tradition as masks for the self-interest, as rhetorical dodges deflecting attention
from the play of conflicting interests.”240 Social causes or claims of ideological
purity can serve as a shield from real critique of legislation or exposure of its
true beneficiaries and consequent public costs.241 Private bargaining is even
more easily hidden when the public can chalk up a decision to these causes or
the politician’s “ideological commitment” rather than to the private interest
gain.242
Public perceptions matter and false impressions have real consequences.
For example, some scholars have discussed the manipulability of an
environmental ethic as the basis for legislation.243 People generally believe the

238. See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the Production of Customary
International Law: The Role of NGOs and United States Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 240
(2004).
239. Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 681, 694–95 (1996–1997). Stephan states:
When discussing the demand for domestic rules, a conventional analysis incorporates the
insights of public choice theory. This body of thought specifies the conditions under
which cohesive minorities may obtain laws for their discrete benefit to the detriment of
unorganized majorities. Similarly, any analysis of the demand for international law must
account for rent-seeking by interest groups. . . . [I]in some instances interest groups may
induce countries to engage in international lawmaking that disserves the populations of
the nations promoting the legislation. The illumination of the conditions under which such
outcomes occur is one of the central tasks of public choice theory.
Id. at 694–95.
240. Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic Critique of Law and
Economics, 44 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 35, 42 (2005). See also Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up
Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 49, 106 (2000) (“the public choice literature . . . claims that statutes favoring
special interest groups will use misleading language to mask the deal codified therein”); Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
THOUGHT 208, 209 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001).
241. Bainbridge, supra note 240, at 209.
242. Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregulation: The Paradox of Financial Reform, 14
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 65, 91 (1996) (“ideology helps to mask the bargaining process from
public view and criticism”); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2539
(2005) (“As Gordon Tullock remarked, most citizens ‘realize that the government can be
expected to do things in their personal interest only if it at least superficially fits the public
image.’ Many are surely sincere in their ideology, but that ideology also matches their selfinterest.”).
243. Zywicki explains:
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mask provided by environmental groups that their desired legislation
represents the “good” and is immune from the “evils” of interest group
politics.244 Yet, there is no reason to believe that such interest groups casting
themselves as representing something “bigger” than profit like
environmentalism are operating and manipulating legislation any differently
than any business-based interest group.245 Environmental groups too are
seeking to get a benefit at a lower cost than would be necessary to pay if they
were forced to bargain in a free market for their preferred outcomes.246 Yet,
again, so long as the public believes that their legislative activities are public
spirited, then that legislation will move forward.
Much the same can be said for the types of legislation that could be
advanced in the name of virtue—another idea that sounds great to the public, is
hard for the public to argue against (who is “anti-virtue”?), is difficult for any
politician to say they oppose without electoral consequences for the same
perception-based reasons, and as a result is highly resistant to review.247 If a
group has a nice buzzword and a worthy sounding cause, the public perception
is changed. The public does not perceive of that group as an “interest group” or
a “special interest” at all, at least not in the “demeaning” or “derogatory” use
of those terms. Instead, the public is even more inclined to believe that the
legislation pushed by such a so-called public-minded group is for their benefit

Environmentalists often claim that environmental activist groups and environmental
regulation is animated by the “public interest,” i.e., an outpouring of “civic
republicanism” that causes individuals to overcome their narrow self-interest and to
support wide-ranging environmental regulatory policies. . . .
. . . [A] brief review of the evidence suggests that the public interest model has little
descriptive accuracy with respect to the behavior of environmental interest groups.
Zywicki, Baptists, supra note 144, at 325–26. See also POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra
note 22, at 2; Adler, supra note 22, at 26; Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 154, at 232 n.46
(“Even regulations that have long been thought to accomplish such worthy goals as improving the
environment recently have been shown to benefit special interests.”); Zywicki, Externalities,
supra note 174, at 856–88 (explaining empirically the political economy of environmental
interests groups).
244. Zywicki, Baptists, supra note 144, at 336 (“[T]he stranglehold that environmental
lobbyists exercise over environmental policy-making is the result of the public perception that
these groups are, in fact, acting according to the public interest.”).
245. Id. at 349 (finding “little obvious difference between environmental activists who want
more for their projects, and farmers, defense contractors, or thousands of others who use the
political process to redistribute money from the public to the goals preferred by their wellorganized and influential interest groups”).
246. Id. (explaining that the environmental rent-seeking helps the groups avoid marketplace
alternatives where those “[n]on-political mechanisms, by contrast, force environmentalists to foot
the bill for their preferences”).
247. Id. at 335 (“the traditional portrayal of environmental interest groups as selfless
‘Baptists’ seeking to advance the public interest is short-sighted”).
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and the public will remain disarmed against and/or ignorant of the wealth
transfers inherent in the relevant legislation.
Furthermore, even where virtue-based interest groups may exist, their
purity is compromised in many circumstances by the cooptation of their
movement from those who seek to pervert the legislative process for nonvirtuous gains. Here, I speak particularly about the phenomenon known as
“Baptists and bootleggers.”248 Bruce Yandle first described this “bootleggers
and Baptists” concept in a 1983 article where he explained the forces behind
the generation of certain laws—known as the Blue laws—that required the
closing of liquor stores in southern states on Sundays.249 The Baptists
supported these closing laws on moral-based and indeed virtue-based
grounds.250 The bootleggers supported these laws because in the absence of
open, legal liquor stores, consumers of alcohol would seek out the illegal
substitute.251
This same coalition continued in the support of outright Prohibition for the
same independent reasons. The bootleggers could obtain a monopoly in the
black market for liquor while the Baptists seemingly thought the ban on
alcohol sales and consumption altogether would improve the moral stock and
virtue of all citizens.252 Yandle posits that neither the Baptists nor the
bootleggers in the Sunday closings and Prohibition stories could have obtained
the legislative restrictions on liquor sales acting alone, but together they were
able to achieve their mutually desired outcome even if their respective desires
were based on diametrically-opposed rationale.253 Interestingly too, though, is
that the bootleggers’ hope—to create a black market monopoly on alcohol and
presumably to continue to supply and have customers consume alcohol—
conflicts with the Baptist goal to use Prohibition as a means to curb
consumption.254 Nonetheless, the Baptists went along and provided the
requisite cover for the bootleggers’ rent-seeking efforts in the legislature to
248. The original work describing the Baptist and bootlegger phenomenon is: Bruce Yandle,
Bootleggers and Baptists—The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7 REG., no. 3, May–June
1983, at 12. The concept has since been further explained and applied in numerous works. See,
e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Common Law and the Environment, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 583,
608–09 (2008) (discussing generally the Baptist and bootlegger theory in relation to
environmental law); Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 10, at 222 (“‘Bootleggers and Baptists’
regulation theory explains how successful lobbying efforts often result when one supporting
group, the ‘Baptists,’ takes the moral high ground while the other group, the ‘bootleggers,’
seeking to gain competitive advantage, provide political resources.”); Zywicki, Baptists, supra
note 144, at 316–17 (explaining the Baptists and bootleggers phenomenon).
249. Yandle, supra note 248, at 12–15.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 14.
254. Yandle, supra note 248, at 12–15.
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obtain a regulation that put the bootleggers at a competitive advantage over
legal suppliers because, well, legal suppliers were legislated out of existence
after Prohibition.255
Since the original Yandle article, many have used the terms “Baptists and
bootleggers” as symbolic labels to attach to similarly-situated coalitions, with
the Baptist label attaching to whatever seemingly do-good or cosmetically
public-spirited interest group involved in a coalition, and with the label
bootlegger going to the ally that is more directly seeking some private gain and
wealth transfer from the legislative deal.256 These seemingly unlikely
combinations are sometimes termed as unholy alliances or described as strange
bedfellows.257
The inclusion of a “worthy” interest supporting legislation increases the
likelihood that the legislative push will succeed because it can persuade the
public that the legislation is in the interest of social welfare258 or at least it will
raise even further the costs of discovering the private interest bargain also
attached to the deceptively positive legislation. The coopting bootleggers will
seek out Baptists to provide a public-spirited “face” for the legislation, at least
partially immunizing such legislation from scrutiny.259 And, the Baptists are
self-interested too, as explained earlier, but even presuming that they are
somehow pure in their ideals and believe that they are acting in the public
interest, they will be persuadable to provide that face due to the substantial
financial backing the bootleggers may be able to bring to the cause.260 The
principled can be compromised or manipulated.261
The public interest cover that the “Baptists” are able to provide for these
pieces of legislation that, like most legislation, involve transfers of wealth from
the many to a concentrated private interest, can deceive the public into

255. Id.
256. See infra notes 259–73 and accompanying text.
257. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Green Jobs Myths, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 326, 345
n.58 (2009) [hereinafter Morriss et al., Green Jobs].
258. Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 188 (2002) (“[T]he push for any given regulation will be most
successful if at least two quite different interest groups are working in the same direction—
’bootleggers’ and ‘Baptists.’”).
259. Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229,
242–43 (2005) (“The ‘Bootleggers’ need a public interest face to make their reforms seem more
popular, and the ‘Baptists’ need a group with a significant personal stake in the outcome to
relentlessly finance or otherwise help to push through the legislation.”).
260. Id.
261. Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Policy, 103
YALE L.J. 2593, 2620–21 (1994) (“Although there is no necessary reason why legislators may not
take principles into account when fashioning legislation, experience supported by pubic choice
theory suggests that they will often give them short shrift.”).
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continuing to believe that legislation is produced in their best interest.262
Attaching an actual “public-interest looking” interest group that can claim
some higher-value agenda (like virtue) can give even the most sinister wealth
transferring legislation a sufficient “cover story” so that private interest
legislation can sneak through the legislature and under the radar of the
rationally-ignorant public.263
We should predict the existence of Baptist and bootlegger coalitions if a
theory of aretaic legislation became dominant—virtue groups would emerge as
Baptists and yet could easily be controlled or coopted by non-virtuous interest
groups interested in a non-virtuous wealth transfer. This was in fact even true
with the events giving rise to the name of the theory—much of the campaign in
support of Prohibition characterized it as designed to prevent the “pervasive
deterioration in the virtue of [the] citizenry” caused by the consumption of
alcohol.264
Baptist and bootlegger coalitions abound in law. These coalitions allow for
the “exploitation of moral—or social-cost arguments for private economic (or
political) gains.”265 Commenters have noted various examples of such
coalitions, including: environmental groups providing cover for a whole host
of private interests;266 ethanol subsidies where producers coordinate with
environmentalists and energy security advocates;267 child labor laws with
coalitions between rights advocates and labor leaders wishing to increase

262. Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 10, at 222 (“The ‘Bootleggers and Baptists’
theory . . . explains how some people might perceive the public interest model of regulation as
still valid.”).
263. Andrew P. Morriss & Benjamin D. Cramer, Disestablishing Environmentalism, 39
ENVTL. L. 309, 357 (2009) (discussing how the Baptists provide “‘theological’ cover for what
would otherwise be naked rent-seeking”). See also Yandle & Buck, supra note 258, at 190
(discussing the “cover story” the Baptist interest can provide).
264. Robert L. Hampel, Massachussetts Society for the Suppression of Intemperance (MSSI),
in 2 ALCOHOL AND TEMPERANCE IN MODERN HISTORY: AN INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
401, 402 (Jack S. Blocker et al. eds., 2003) (explaining prohibition in part driven by a view that
noting the alcohol consumption was “part of a pervasive deterioration in the virtue of [the]
citizenry,” primarily advanced by the Massachusetts Society for the Suppression of
Intemperance).
265. M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1533 (2009).
266. See, e.g., Zywicki, Baptists, supra note 144, at 345.
267. Hahn, supra note 160, at 463 (“There is another important reason policies to promote
ethanol may receive widespread political support. They are not only supported by interest groups
who directly profit from such government intervention, but also by some interest groups
concerned with energy security and the environment that primarily support cellulosic ethanol in
particular.”). See also Morriss & Cramer, supra note 263, at 356–57 (describing ethanol subsidies
and explaining that “ethanol’s self-interested proponents have successfully hijacked the rhetoric
of Environmentalism in their pursuit of government support, as have myriad other ‘green energy’
interests.”).
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wages;268 crime victims groups and prosecutors at seeking criminal law,
criminal procedure, and evidence rules reform;269 campaigns for green jobs
legislation with coalitions between environmental groups and mass transit
construction companies along with unions;270 Obamacare and health reform
legislation saw coalitions of social rights and public health advocates coupled
with medical industry groups;271 health care agencies and social welfare
advocates for cleaner lifestyles joined with plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking
tobacco regulation;272 and global climate change legislative efforts have seen
environmentalists paired with “companies, interests, and countries” that stand
to gain from their competitors being taxed by climate change regulation.273
So either with masking alone or with masking coupled with a Baptist and
bootlegger coalition, interest groups hide the true character of legislation.
These phenomena are problematic for obtaining public interested legislation
and for monitoring against rent-seeking. Such problems would present
themselves just as strongly if, instead of desiring public interested legislation,

268. Henderson, supra note 265, at 1533 (providing examples of child labor laws in England
and tobacco legislation in the United States as examples with Baptist and bootlegger coalitions).
269. O’Hara, supra note 259, at 243. See also Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1396–97 (2005) (describing the bootlegger/Baptists coalitions in victim
rights’ advocacy but that the “purity” of the movement is impossible because “[o]ne consequence
of crime victims’ dependence on prosecutors to further the legislative agenda is the inability of
either partner to effect reforms without the approval of the other”).
270. Morriss et al., Green Jobs, supra note 257, at 345 (“Before policymakers adopt green
jobs strategies, they need to be aware that these proposals are often simply part of a ‘Bootleggers
and Baptists’ coalition to achieve unrelated policy aims of the labor movement.”).
271. Ilya Somin, A Mandate for Mandates: Is the Individual Health Insurance Case a
Slippery Slope?, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 78 (2012) (describing the promotion of health
care mandates as a Baptist/Bootlegger issue combining “public health advocates and industry
interest groups”).
272. Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: Regulating Tobacco by
Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225, 1281 (2008) (describing the bootleggers/Baptists alliances
used to call for greater regulation of tobacco, including health agencies and plaintiffs’ attorneys).
273. Yandle and Buck’s explanation of Baptists and bootleggers in climate change includes
the following:
Global climate negotiations have been rich with bootlegger-Baptist coalitions. The
Baptists are the active environmental groups pushing for ratification and enforcement of
the treaty, and working to prevent backsliding. They are passionate and persuasive to the
public as they argue that cutting back on carbon emissions is a moral necessity.
....
The bootleggers are the special interest groups that are positioned to gain from
regulatory enforcement and stringency or that must fend off losses that spring from
proposed rules. . . . Environmental activists provide the cover story on which media
attention is focused, while companies, industries, and countries work quietly in the
background to gain benefits.
Yandle & Buck, supra note 258, at 189–90.
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we were somehow specifically directing legislatures to produce aretaic
legislation.
One author, Michael Fitts, has discussed one of the problems associated
with trying to enforce “civic virtue” requirements through legislation as
positioned against the real world complication of masking.274 In his work, Fitts
asks whether courts could police legislative motives and control masking.275
Fitts is skeptical of a rule of judicial interpretation that would allow courts to
determine whether the legislature acted in a manner consistent with civic virtue
precisely because the legislature could slap the virtue label on legislation and
otherwise attempt to deceive the courts and the public.276
As Fitts explains, in such an interpretive regime there is a concern with
“the problem of deception—how do the courts determine whether in fact the
relevant actors in a legislature, once identified, are indeed engaging in the type
of principled decision making that is the heart of the civic virtue ideal.”277 Fitts
explains that one can paper the record with “evidence” of virtuous intent that
could simply be a mask.278 As a result, a virtue “label” could serve to shield
legislation from more effective scrutiny.279 He concludes that “the civic virtue
theorists raise the specter of government actors masking their true intentions
behind a smoke screen of public-regarding verbiage. It simply is not possible
to ensure that people are public-regarding merely because they defend or
rationalize their actions on those grounds, or alternatively, that legislative
actors are private-regarding simply because” their actions help a private
interest.280 This critique of civic virtue legislation should equally apply to
aretaic legislation. There is no reason to believe the results would be any
different under an even broader virtue-based legislation command modeled
around the virtue jurisprudence and aretaic push.
In the end, we should expect that legislation will be masked. We should be
suspicious of all legislation as a result, no matter if it is clothed in the ideals of
virtue or claimed to serve some other broad social policy. Legislation tagged as
advancing the ideals of virtue risks directing our attention away from the
realities of the legislative process and interest group bargaining,281 and

274. Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue
Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1598–1601 (1988).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1600.
278. Id. (“In a world of paper records, it is quite easy for legislators, like their administrative
counterparts, to create a paper record that bears little relationship to what in fact is going on in the
internal legislative deliberations.”).
279. Fitts, supra note 274, at 1600.
280. Id. at 1601.
281. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice
Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1340–41 (1994) (Easterbrook explains the difficulties of
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therefore may in fact lead us to be deceived into believing the tags placed on
legislation rather than their true goals and motivating forces. Our analysis and
investigation of legislation needed to expose its true nature then becomes
dangerously muted as we become distracted away from seeing the necessity of
being vigilant in that review.
V. PUBLIC CHOICE AND VIRTUE—SOME FINAL SYNTHESIZING THOUGHTS
Public choice has become a dominant mode of analysis282 for evaluating
the production of legislation.283 Politicians, political parties, and interest
groups all act self-interestedly.284 Legislators are almost always seduced into
the interest group bargaining game because unilateral disengagement has little
utility—it deprives the legislator of the personal gains in the process and even
if they are civic-minded it would deprive her constituents of the benefits to be
gained in pork—in fact the rational constituent might even want their legislator
to play the game if they knew the costs of disengagement.285 The prevalence of
private interest legislation is in large part the result of the failure of a collective
public virtue to act as any effective check on the interest group process.286

operating government based on idealistic notions of virtue: “[W]e must concern ourselves with
the functional questions that occupied Madison . . . . Public choice theory suggests that this whole
debate is beside the point. The choice is not expertise versus vigor and coordination. These are
ideals, claims based on virtue in government. Proposals based on these ideals—to appoint better
people, to produce more openness in government, and so on—miss the point of Madison’s
argument: ideals of virtuous administration may direct attention away from how government
operates in practice.”).
282. Yandle & Buck, supra note 258, at 188 (“The economic theory of regulation is so
instructive that, as one economist observes, ‘opposing theories of regulation have been pretty
thoroughly driven from the scene.’”).
283. On public choice theory, see, for example, KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963); BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 155; OLSON, supra note 196;
MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE & PUBLIC LAW: READINGS & COMMENTARY xviii–xxiii
(1997) (summarizing major schools of public choice scholarship); Stigler, supra note 152.
284. Gardner, supra note 141, at 167 n.348 (“[T]here are good reasons to doubt whether
political parties are capable of behaving in the way the responsible party model presupposes. A
substantial body of public choice literature claims that parties, like other political actors, behave
self-interestedly.”).
285. Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence
in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 947 n.102 (1990) (“If the constituents should elect
a civically virtuous representative, she alone would not be able to change the nature of the regime
or political bargains, but could only deprive her constituents of their piece of the pie.”).
286. Easterbrook, supra note 281, at 1334. (Easterbrook summarizes the barriers public
choice realities pose for the attainment of a government based on virtue: “Private interest
legislation is common today, much more so than in 1787, and more common at the national level
than among the states—the opposite of Madison’s belief about what would happen. This
predictive failure can be explained as the result of a variety of factors well known to public choice
theory: limits on representatives’ freedom from factions’ influence; increased specialization in
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Factions destroy that open space where virtuous legislators—even if they could
possibly exist—could operate.287
Public choice theory is grounded in a belief that legislation should not be
presumed to be in the public interest.288 There is no doubt that it presents a
cynical view and offers little optimism for those that wish to introduce noble
metrics like “virtue” into the political decision-making process.289
Within the available literature on virtue theories, an article by Eric Claeys
provides the best support for a public choice critique of virtue enhancing
legislation.290 Claeys is dealing with imposition of virtue as a controlling ethic
for legitimate rule making, although much of his focus is on judicial and
common law rules.291 Unlike Claeys’s valuable examination of the
development of virtue theories, this Article concerns itself only with their
application to legislation and the masking phenomena that is perpetuated by
using virtue as a justification for or guiding principle of legislation. Claeys
does not mention masking per se or specifically reference interest group
theory, but his conclusions share several similar bases especially when he
discusses what he terms “virtue politics.”292
For example, Clays contends that “the legal system does have, and may
tolerate, a little virtue-centric regulation,” but follows that “there are also
important reasons to be pessimistic that a legal system can remain humane
while promoting actively ‘virtue’ or some of the virtues.”293 There is,
according to Claeys, a natural tendency to manipulate “virtue” for selfish ends
if it becomes a metric in the domains of law and politics because “competing
religious, ethnic, or partisan factions find it hard to resist the temptation to use
virtue theory as an ideological tool, to establish hegemony over rival factions
in their local communities.”294 Specifically, he touches on the concept of

production; free rider obstacles to political participation; the considerable advantages to interest
groups of obtaining national legislation; and the failure of collective virtue.”).
287. Id.
288. Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political, and
Constitutional Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761, 1765 n.18 (1999) (“Public choice theory . . .
counsels skepticism about whether there exists such a phenomenon as ‘public-regardingness’”).
289. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 155, at 2 (“[O]n initial acquaintance with the public
choice literature, the reader is likely to come away with a feeling of despair about the political
process.”).
290. See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 11.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 946–47.
293. Id. at 891.
294. Id. at 892. When Claeys discusses factions, he seems concerned with more extreme
power grabs than the more nuanced use of masking in the legislative process. For example, where
this Article is concerned with the soft-tyranny of subterfuge, Claeys is often talking about the
hard usurpation of the concept by actual and more overt tyrannical rule imposition. Consider the
following, for example: “Virtue-based regimes encourage the tyrants and the totalitarians
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interest groups—or factions—briefly in the above passage and a few other
parts of his general critique of virtue-centric theories in a way largely
consistent with the conclusions reached here:
Politics often involves large struggles in which some factions seek to acquire
control or superior status over others. In practice, theories centered around
virtue reinforce such factions’ drives to be factious and acquire hegemonic
power. Virtue theories can therefore be extremely destructive and inhumane.
This possibility does not make all virtue regulation inappropriate. But it does
295
make virtue theory problematic as a dominant category in politics.

From this passage it appears that Claeys perhaps leaves more room for virtue
centered regulation than the conclusions in this Article might call for.
Moreover, I would contend that it is difficult to see how one would logistically
be able to distinguish between appropriate an “inappropriate” virtue
regulations, especially as all legislation and regulation are capable of the same
public choice critique. However, Claeys’s ultimate conclusion lies in his
defense of liberalism as superior to any value-laden virtue-centric theories.296
He finds support for that preference in the work of John Locke as well, who he
contends “deliberately structures Lockean liberalism to compartmentalize
virtue as far away from politics as possible.”297 Virtue must remain an
individualized pursuit;298 it cannot be commanded by politics.299
We cannot expect interest groups to be virtuous in the ends sought or
lawmaking to be virtuous in the commodities offered and produced. In fact,
even the production of virtue-based regulation itself is likely to involve
factions seeking self-interested transfers masked as some universal virtuous
end hiding the truth that the legislation is instead feeding their private agenda.

straightaway. In not only their worst but also their bad cases, virtue-based politics embolden a
control group to wage civil war, to acquire comprehensive political control, on the pretext of
wanting to compel everyone else to be virtuous.” Id. at 927. While I agree that this hard danger
too should be cause for concern, I think the more likely danger is through seemingly benign
legislation masked in the public interest that leads to even greater inefficient transfers of wealth.
295. Claeys, supra note 11, at 917.
296. Claeys concludes that:
[I]n the political, religious, and ethnographic conditions that inform modernity, liberal
politics is probably more humane and prudent than pure virtue politics. Liberalism refers
to a political regime that creates space for each citizen to think about or believe what he
finds most needful. To do so, liberalism organizes politics not around the pursuit of virtue
but the protection of rights.
Id. at 927.
297. Id. at 928.
298. Id. (“Liberalism is defensible in a virtue framework as the most humane and prudent
means realistically available to secure the most virtue and eudaimoneia possible.”).
299. Claeys, supra note 11, at 917 (“Principles that work well as hypothetical rules of
practical conduct for individuals may not work as well as compulsory rules of practical conduct
for citizens.”).
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Furthermore, agency rules even after the passage of legislation further risk
cooptation of the virtue concept as bureaucracies tend to exhibit selfperpetuating behavior,300 and if we give them a new mandate like virtue they
are likely to exploit it.301
Easterbrook contends that self-interest will always prevail over virtue and
that cognitive dissonance will allow political actors to convince themselves
that their self-interest is aligned with virtuous behavior.302 Such self-deception
ensures that any virtue-enhancing metric employed will be self-defeating and
virtue will become manipulated in a decision maker’s mind to equate with selfinterest rather than to act as a check against it.
The mantle of virtue will be championed by advocates of all sorts. The
term will be claimed and coopted by multiple and sometimes divergent causes.
As Claeys soundly concludes, “[w]hen politics is about legislating virtue and
not about securing rights, it tempts sectarian believers to gain political power
to compel subjects to be virtuous as defined by the teachings of their particular
sect. Since Enlightenment philosophy is universalist, non-religious political
ideologues can suffer from the same temptations.”303 There is this danger
where the privilege of power might be used to impose one’s own “rule” by
their individualized concept of “virtue” veiled in a standard that has been
adopted as supreme. This could very easily occur when adopting an aretaic
ethic for testing the legitimacy of legislation. Determining who are the good
virtue imposers versus those that are the bad ones is an incredibly difficult task
and as such further facilitates rent-seeking due to the inability to identify those
pieces of legislation one should scrutinize.304
In a world where virtue is the stated dominant legislative end, we will see
“virtue lobbyists” who will be no different than any other shills for an interest.
Lobbyists will pervert virtue for their own ends and utilize the mask to slide
through their private agendas. In fact, we already have this occurring where
folks use a virtue-like shield for their legislation, even though we are not yet
300. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY & REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971) (arguing that bureaucracies seek to maximize their budgets); GEORGE C.
ROCHE, AMERICA BY THE THROAT: THE STRANGLEHOLD OF FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1983);
LUDWIG VON MISES, BUREAUCRACY (1944).
301. Zywicki, Externalities, supra note 174, at 890 (“Bureaucrats seek larger budgets and
greater power for themselves.”).
302. Easterbrook, supra note 281, at 1330 (“People care more about themselves than about
others. . . . [S]elf love dominates even when people know intellectually that virtuous conduct
would be better. When the conflict between self and virtue is irreconcilable, cognitive dissonance
leads people to conclude that civic virtue and personal ends coincide.”).
303. Claeys, supra note 11, at 926.
304. Henderson, supra note 265, at 1533 (“Distinguishing between bad nanny types (or
between good and bad nannies) is difficult. The more difficult it is to sort ex ante between good
and bad, the greater the opportunity for nannies to rent seek and profit from imposing nanny
rules.”).
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operating under a system where virtue is raised to some heightened status (as
perhaps could occur with the adoption of a virtue jurisprudential theory of
aretaic legislation. Adopting a command for the production of aretaic
legislation would only provide a vehicle for masking and the abuse of the
concept will occur for purposes of private wealth transfers.305
In the end, the overuse of “virtue” also risks the dilution of virtue as a
meaningful term and risks leaving strategies for its advancement with little
resulting value. In fact, adopting a virtue-based legislation metric is dangerous
because if virtue is set up as legitimate criteria with heightened status it will
create cover for and insulate from review private interest rent-seeking. Often in
these transactions with a social agenda attached, not only does the private
interest transfer skew the true reason for the legislation but often the diversion
of resources accomplished actually harms the potential to achieve the stated
goal.306 We should also expect to have Baptist/bootlegger issues where the
virtue Baptists will help cloak the private interest agendas of the bootleggers
who have no interest in virtue but wish to piggyback on the virtue clamor.
In the political sphere, the supposed or stated advancement of “virtue”
should not be a decision rule. Virtue should receive no special status, but
instead at most should just be one of many metrics within the open public
discourse
Of course, whenever government starts to compel individual behavior in a
“nanny” type way as it might in a world where virtue legislation dominates,
they may be unable to evaluate where to set the rules to achieve positive social
benefits.307 Worse yet, imposing virtue standards could backfire and encourage
more non-virtuous behavior. The rise of black markets for booze and the
criminal syndicates that came with it during prohibition is one such example of
where legislating virtue has a “Whac-A-Mole” effect, hammering one thing
down only to cause a different or worse vice to pop up in its place.308

305. Claeys, supra note 11, at 922 (“When politics encourages citizens to use law to make
citizens virtuous, it encourages factious citizens to use ‘virtue’ as a political and ideological
bludgeon to help their own factions acquire dominancy and to subordinate rival factions.”).
306. Zywicki, Externalities, supra note 174, at 849–50 (explaining that the concentrated
benefits from environmental rent-seeking hurts the dispersed public but also crowds out more
innovative solutions by stifling “competition and entrepreneurship” in the provision of
environmental goods).
307. Henderson, supra note 265, at 1532 (“[N]annyism, whatever its source, may be socially
suboptimal. The first type of bad nanny is one with good intentions that makes mistakes in
calculating the social costs and benefits from particular behaviors.”).
308. Henderson, supra note 265, at 1532–33 (describing Prohibition as a time during which
“[t]he government as nanny believed that it could reduce the costs imposed by drinking without
raising other costs and distorting natural behaviors in unpredictable ways. In other words, the
cost-benefit calculation done by the regulator excluded the dynamic costs that arose from the
regulation itself.”).
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While Madison believed in part that virtue could prevail, Easterbrook
explains that the faith in virtue was misplaced:
[T]here is a more fundamental explanation for the failure of Madison’s
predictions regarding the interplay between public and private interest in
national government. The core of Madisonian resistance—the common weal to
be found and implemented by virtuous legislators—turns out to be empty. It is
not simply that Rousseau’s concept of general will is hollow. It is that there is
no virtuous way to aggregate private wills into collective decisions. People of
good will have no common ground around which to rally! They have their own
conceptions of the public interest but no way to insist that the collective choice
necessarily reflect their views. We are doomed by the logic of majority voting
309
to aggregate private preferences rather than to find a common public good.

We simply cannot find and then implement a common good through legislative
processes. We may be faced with the impossibility of virtue evolving at least
from legislation if not an impossibility in all of law and politics.
The American Founders believed in virtue and many were influenced by
the works of Aristotle.310 A problem inherent in the Aristotelian vision is that if
one believes that “the best government, according to Aristotle, is the one that
seeks the common interest or good, not private interests,”311 and “the political
community exists to allow citizens to live virtuously,”312 yet one also
recognizes the realities exposed by public choice, then it is impossible to
conclude that virtue can be advanced within the political community without
serving private interests over the common good. The lessons of public choice
discussed in this Article help explain this impossibility. The only way to
achieve the common good or interest then may be to produce the least laws and
to develop mechanisms that minimize the production of laws or make
lawmaking so costly and difficult that it is no longer economically rational to
invest in rent-seeking behavior.
Because there is a high probability that any piece of legislation is nonvirtuous legislation, focusing on limitations on the output of legislation may be
309. Easterbrook, supra note 281, at 1339.
310. Feldman describes the level of Aristotelian influence on the Founders and their design as
follows:
[I]n The Federalist, Publius mentioned—but did not emphasize—that Americans possess
sufficient virtue to maintain self-government and that our governmental leaders should be
imbued with civic virtue so that they will naturally pursue the public good. This form of
virtue is Aristotelian in nature: one must act prudently, sagaciously, and for the good of
one’s political community. The framers, moreover, believed themselves to be exercising
civic virtue as they deliberated—as Aristotle had recommended—about the common good
of America and how that common good should be embodied and protected in a
constitution.”
Feldman, supra note 34, at 692–93.
311. Id. at 689.
312. Id. at 690.
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the better means of encouraging virtue, in turn leaving individuals free to
pursue virtue in the private sphere. Ultimately the most virtue-enhancing
theory of governance would be one that keeps production of legislation low,
based on the presumption that most legislation is necessarily virtue-inhibiting
in that it involves self-interested wealth transfers.
CONCLUSION
Any theory of aretaic legislation must necessarily confront the public
choice realities of the legislative process. This Article contends that most of the
teachings of public choice counsel against holding much optimism that virtue
could ever be seen as a realistic guiding metric for the creation of legislation.
Although no comprehensive theory of aretaic legislation appears to be offered
to date in the scholarly literature, those advocating more aretaic theories in the
law seem to contemplate a place for virtue in our shaping or judgment of
legislation.
Virtue is a concept that would be manipulated in legislation in the same
manner as other terms like “public interest” have been in the past to attempt to
mask the true nature of legislation, the private deals involved, and the true
beneficiaries and purposes of any legislation regardless of its label. Should
“virtue” become the popular new ethic, test, standard, aim, or end when it
comes to legislation, public choice theory predicts that the term will lack any
true substance and most legislation will be drafted to seem virtuous to the
public on its outside but have the same interior filled with dangerous rentseeking bounties.

